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1. SUMMARY: · Appellant challenges the DC's decision 
declaring a portion of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976 unconstitutional. 





Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, codified at 43 u.s.c~ 
§1744, was designed to alleviate the problems caused by the 
encumbrance of federal lands with numerous unpatented mining 
claims. The existence of thes unknown claims made it difficult 
for federal land managers to take actions affecting federal land 
for fear of interfering with the rights accorded to claimants 
under the federal mining laws. Each time the Bureau of Land 
Management proposed a sale or other conveyance of land, it was 
necessary to make a lengthy search of county records and to 
initiate a mining contest to determine the validity of any claims 
uncovered in the search. 
Section 314 was enacted to provide a federal recordation 
system and rid federal lands of stale mining claims. Section 
314(a) requires the owners of unpatented claims located prior to 
October 21, 1976, within three years of that date and "prior to 
December 31, of each year therafter," to file with BLM a notice of 
intention to hold the claim or an affidavit of assessment work 
performed on the claim. The same yearly filing requirement was 
placed on holders of claims located after October 21, 1976. 
Section 314(b) required the holder of a claim to file an official 
record of the notice of location or certificate of location within 
90 days of location. Those whose claims were located before 
October 21, 1976, were given three years from that date to comply 
with this filing requirement. Failure to file with the 
r~quirements of § 314 (a) and (b) was "deemed conclusively to 
constitute an abandonment of the mining claim ••• by the owner," 
except in certain enumerated circumstances. The BLM promulgated 
( 
regulations providing that the owner of an unpatented mining claim 
located on federal land on or before October 21, 1976, must file 
the documents required by§ 314(a) on or before October 22, 1979, 
and "on or before December 30 of each calendar year" thereafter. 
Appellees are mining claimants whose ten unpatented claims 
were located on federal lands in Nevada in 1952 and 1955. On 
October 19, 1979, they complied with the initial filing 
requirements for pre-October 21, 1976, claims. In 1980, however, 
appellees waited until December 31 to hand deliver their 
affidavits of annual assessment work to the Nevada BLM office, 
thus missing the deadline by one day. On April 4, 1981, the BLM 
informed appellees that their claims had been declared abandoned 
and void because they had failed to file the requisite documents 
by December 30, 1980. 
Appellees sought review of the BLM action, claiming that they 
were erroneously advised of the filing date by unnamed BLM 
personnel and that § 314 and the implementing regulations are 
unconstitutional and invalid because they resulted in taking 
appellees' property without notice and opportunity to be heard. 
The Interior Board of Land Appeals affirmed the BLM determination. 
Appellees filed this action in the DC. The DC granted summary 
judgment for appellees, holding that § 314 is an "unconstitutional 
violation of procedural due process insofar as it creates an 
irrebuttable presu~ption of abandonment for failure to timely file 
the annual assessment notice." Applying the analysis set forth in 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 u.s. 441 (1973), the DC determined that 




without due process because the statute creates a constructi~e 
presumption of abandonment that is "not necessarily or universally 
true in fact" and because BLM could easily notify claimants of 
their failure to meet a filing deadline and hold a preforfeiture 
hearing in cases in which there is a dispute over whether an 
abandonment has occurred. The DC went on to hold that even if 
appellees had not been deprived of their due process rights, they 
would still prevail because they had substantially complied with § 
314 by submitting the required notices one day after the statutory 
deadline. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the issue here is 
substantial because the DC's decision prevents uniform 
administration of the federal recordation system and undermines 
the administrative workability of the system in Nevada. The 
decision also casts doubt on the status of approximately 40,000 
mining claims previously determined to be invalid because of the 
failure of claimants to make timely annual filings. The DC 
decision makes § 314 a virtual nullity and returns Nevada to the 
situation that existed prior to passage of § 314. 
The DC's decision is erroneous. The power of Congress to 
manage and control the mineral resources of the public domain is 
very broad. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 u.s. 529, 539 (1976). This 
extensive power is clearly broad enough to encompass§ 314, which 
conditions retention of unpatented mining claims on the 
claimiant's compliance with filing deadlines, for the Court has 
held that state governments, in legislating with respect to 






property right upon the performance of an act within a limited 
period of time." Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 u.s. 516, 529 (1982). 
A fortiori, imposition of such a condition is within the power of 
Congress over the public domain. 
Conditioning retention of unpatented mining claims on the 
filing of annual notice is fully consistent with due process 
requirements. Termination of stale claims provides the only 
reliable tool for enforcement of the filing requirements and thus 
is essential to an "accurate and perpetual inventory of mining 
claims on the public lands of those persons who assert an interest 
in [such] claims." Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. 
Supp. 309, 314 (D. Utah 1979), aff'd 649 F.2d 775 (CAlO 1981). 
The statute itself provides notice to claimnats of the 
consequences of failure to make timely filings. Due process does 
not require individualized notice to claimants that they risk 
invalidation of their claims if they do not meet the statutory 
filing deadline. 
The irrebuttable presumption analysis of Vlandis has no 
application in this case. The DC reasoned that § 314 creates a 
conclusive presumption of abandonment that is not necessarily or 
universally true in fact since failure to make a timely filing 
does not always signify intent to abandon a claim. Congress, 
however, did not make the invalidation of a claim turn on 
abandonment or intent to abandon, but solely on whether the 
claimant had met the statutory filing requirements. Similarly, 
since termination turns on failure to file rather than on intent 




unnecessary. Even if such procedures were useful, they would not 
be reasonable, since they would impose the same burden on BLM the 
statute was designed to alleviate. 
The DC's alternative holding, that appellees substantially 
complied with the statutory requirements is inconsistent with 
Congress' goal of enabling BLM to obtain complete and up-to-date 
information on the status of the mining claims on federal lands. 
The DC's failure to define the boundaries of "substantial 
compliance" leaves that task to BLM. Regardless of what grace 
period BLM chose, there would always be a claimant who filed a day 
or two after its expiration. Case-by-case determinations of 
substantial compliance would be very burdensome. The DC relied on 
Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 u.s. 48, 57 (1970), in which the 
Court stated that substantial compliance is sufficient to meet the 
annual assessment work requirement of the general mining law, 30 
u.s.c. 28. The applicable statute in Hickel conditioned retention 
of unpatented mining claims on performance of assessment work "in 
compliance with the laws," not on filing of particular documents. 
Section 314(c), moreover, expressly provides that failure to meet 
the filing requirements "shall be deemed conclusively" to 
constitute abandonment of the claim. 
4. DISCUSSION: The SG has made a convincing case with 
respect to both the merits and the significance of the case. No 
motion to dismiss or affirm has been · filed. I recommend that the 
Court call for a response. Unless that response points out flaws 
in the SG's analysis that I do not perceive, I think the Court 
should consider a summary reversal. 
'. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: CFR with an eye toward summary reversal. 
There is no response. 
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Memorandum for the File 
No. 83-1394, United States v. Locke, et al. 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
This is a direct appeal from the DC of Nevada that invalidated 
Q>.<'b-
§314 of the Federal Land Policy ~ Management Act of 1976. The 
DC found a denial of procedural due process to the extent it 
authorized the voiding of a mining claim for failure to file 
"on or before December 30 of each year" a notice of intention to 
hold the claim. 
The Facts 
Appellees (members of the Locke family) acquired valid claims, 
under federal law, to ten tracts of land prior to 1960. Since that 
date appellees have earned their livelihood by mining gravel. In the 
1979-80 assessment year, the value of materials mined from these 
claims exceeded $1,000,000. The claims were located on public land 
belonging to the United States. 
Because of inadequate records and certainty as to the existence 
and ownership of unpatented mining claims in western states, the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act was adopted in 1976 that 
required registration of such claims with the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment. Holders of claims wre required to register by October 21, 
1979. Appellees duly complied by registering or recording their 
claims on October 19, 1979. The statute further required that in 
each clanedar year thereafter, holders of unpatented claims must 
file an "assessment notice'' showing that at least $100 of labor 
No. 83-1394 2. 
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had been pe~ormed during the year. The statute explicitly ~ 
provides tha~"the failure to file such an instrument ... shall 
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of mining 
claim ... by the owner". This §314(c) of the Act is implemented 
by regulations to the same effect. 
Appellees, due to a misunderstanding and thinking that this 
annual report could be filed on or before December 31 of the year, 
hand-delivered the report or notice on December 31. This failed 
to comply with the statutory language of "on or before December 
30". 
Appellees were notified that this failure constituted a 
conclusive abandonment of their ten claims. The Act provides for 
administrative appeal or review. Appellees went first to the 
Department of Interior, and wre advised that their claims "are 
hereby declared abandoned and void". See Jurisdictional Statement 
22(a). Appellee then appealed to the Board of Land Appeals, and 
again received an adverse decision. The ALJ ruled that the Board 
had "no authority to excuse lack of compliance" with the statute. 
With respect to appellees' due process claim, the ALJ held there 
was no denial of due process "so long as the individual is given 
notice (of the abandonment) and an opportunity to be heard 
before the decision becomes final". p. 20A 
Decision of the DC 
This suit was instituted challenging the consitutionality of 
section 314 onthe ground that appellees' property was taken without 
due process of law. The DC, relying primarily on Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441 (1973), held that the statute created an unlawful 
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provides tha-t)"the failure to file such an instrument ... shall 
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of mining 
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by regulations to the same effect. 
Appellees, due to a misunderstanding and thinking that this 
annual report could be filed on or before December 31 of the year, 
hand-delivered the report or notice on December 31. This failed 
to comply with the statutory language of "on or before December 
30". 
Appellees were notified that this failure constituted a 
conclusive abandonment of their ten claims. The Act provides for 
administrative appeal or review. Appellees went first to the 
Department of Interior, and wre advised that their claims "are 
hereby declared abandoned and void". See Jurisdictional Statement 
22(a). Appellee then appealed to the Board of Land Appeals, and 
again received an adverse decision. The ALJ ruled that the Board 
had "no authority to excuse lack of compliance" with the statute. 
With respect to appellees' due process claim, the ALJ held there 
was no denial of due process "so long as the individual is given 
notice (of the abandonment) and an opportunity to be heard 
before the decision becomes final". p. 20A 
Decision of the DC 
This suit was instituted challenging the consitutionality of 
section 314 onthe ground that appellees' property was taken without 
due process of law. The DC, relying primarily on Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441 (1973), held that the statute created an unlawful 
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irrebuttable presumption. The DC reasoned that appellees had 
IL '' a property right that was "forfeited" and found to be void 
without affording procedural safeguards required by due process. 
The rationale of the DC's opinion is not entirely clear. Apparently 
it thought that there should have been an opportunity to rebutt the 
presumption of abandonment. This is an appealing argument in a 
case like this where it is clear beyond question that appellees had 
no intention to abandon claims that had provided that livelihood 
for years. The case would not be as appealing had there been a 
failure to comply with the mandatory registration or recording of 
claims by October 31. 
I am not persuaded by the view of the ALJ that all appropriate 
due process was given by the right to appeal to the Secretary of 
the Interior before the abandonment became final. The ALJ had 
recognized that the Secretary had no authority "to excuse lack 
of compliance" with the December 30 filing date. The "right to 
appeal" was an empty one. 
Comment 
The SG- concedes that appellees had a property right, a con-
cession required by our cases. The SG makes the obvious point 
that the United States has a "paramount title" to unpatented 
mining claims, but one would think that such an interest could 
not be extinguished lawfully - at least under present law - without 
a hearing. I do not understand the SG to argue that Congress could 
simply cancel all unpatented mining claims without providing some 
No. 83-1394 4. 
reasonable time for the holders thereof to end their mining 
businesses. In this case appellees apparently had made invest-
ments of buildings and equipment. 
I have undertaken no review of our numerous procedural 
due process cases. Going back to Fuentes, Snidach, Memphis 
Light, Matthews v. Eldridge, and several others, we have afforded 
procedural due process where property or expectation thereof was 
being taken. I hope we can develop a sound rationale for affirming 
the DC, as certainly there is injustice in this case. Our Court 
will have to be careful, however, to recognize that statutes of 
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Whether §314 of the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act of 1976, 43 u.s.c. §1744, violates due process 
by providing that a failure to file a timely notice of in-
tention to hold a mining claim or affidavit of annual as-
sessment work shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the claim. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background. 
Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976, 43 u.s.c. §1744, provides: 
·-,· .. "'t •. 
"(a) Filing Requirements 
The owner of an unpatented load or placer 
mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976, 
shall, within the three-year period following 
October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31 of each 
year thereafter, file the 1nstruments required by 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. 
* * * 
(1) File for record in the office where the 
location notice or certificate is recorded either 
a notice of intention to hold the mining claim 
... , [or] an affidavit of assessment work per-
formed thereon 
(2) File in the office of the Bureau 
designiated by the Secretary a copy of the offi-
cial record of the instrument filed or recorded 
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, 
including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed 
lands on the ground. 
*** 
(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; 
defective or untimely filing 
The failure to file such instruments as re-
quired by subsections (a) and (b) of this section 
shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the mining c!a"1.m •••• ,, ------
·. 
The regs make the filing date and the consequences 
for missing it even clearer. 43 C.F.R. §§3833.2-l(b) (1) & 
3833.4. 
B. Factual Background. 
Appees own ten unpatented mining claims on United 
States government lands from which they produce gravel and 
building materials. Since 1960 they have produced approxi-
mately $4,000,000 in materials. In 1976, the United States 
enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 
u.s.c. §§1701-1782 ("FLPMA"), which required all holders of 
unpatented claims to register them with the Bureau of Land~ 
Management (BLM) by Oct. 21, 1979. Appees fully complied ~ 
with this initial requirement. Each calandar year there-
after, FLPMA further requires 
31" of an assessment notice ---
the filing "prior to December I-s~ 
~
(showing that $100 worth of /Jt-6 ~ 
labor has been performed on the claim during the assessment 
year) or a notice of intention to retain the claim. 43 
u.s.c. §1744(a). 
In an effort to comply with this provision, appees 
sent their daughter to the Reno BLM office to inquire about ______ ......,_ 
the procedures. According to her uncontradicted affidavit, 
~-
she was told that the documents should be filed at the Reno  
BLM office "on or before December 31, 1980," not "prior to 
Dec. 31" as the statute and the regs require. Appees then 
hand-delivered the documents to the Reno office on December 
31, 1980. On April 4, 1981, appees received notice that 
their mining claims were "abandoned and void" for failure -
to file "on or before December 30." They appealed the dec-
laration of abandonment to the Interior Board of Land Ap-
peals (IBLA). That body ruled on June 25, 1982 that 
appees' failure to file a timely notice forfeited their 
claims. The IBLA refused to address appees constitutional 
arguments and so they filed this action in D.Nev. to 
lenge the constitutionality of 43 u.s.c. §1744. 
-----------------------------------
claimed it deprived them of procedural due process 




under J7 t., 
v 
The DC (Thompson, J.), relying on prior cases of 
this Court discussing mining claims, found a property in- ~. 
terest warranting due It then held ~~ 
that under this Court's line of "irrebuttable presumption" 
cases, ~, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 u.s. 441 (1973); Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 u.s. 645 (1972), the procedural safeguards 
given to miners under the FLPMA were constitutionally inad-
equate. It read Vlandis as creating a two-prong test: "If 
the presumption is not necessarily or universally true in 
fact and the government has available reasonable alterna-
tive means of making the crucial determination, then due 
process demands a hearing to rebut the presumption." App. 
to J.S. Sa. The present case, it found, demonstrated that 
the presumption was not "necessarily or universally true in 
fact, • and the DC also believed that individual determina~~: 
tions at hearings would be both feasible and more accurate. ~~ 
Accordingly, it held that hearings were ~c:_ - --~+------------------
constitutionally required. ~~~~QQ~n the statute 
.__ - "" as applied to resps on the ground that the legislative his-
tory indicated that the purpose of the FLPMA was to "main-
tain a current index of non-patented claims merely for the 
convenience of federal land managers." Since there was no 
purpose to "clear long-dormant claims," it held, the 
BLM had to accept substantial compliance with its filing 
requirements. 
II. Discussion 
Since this Court has held that unpatented mining 
~ claims constitute a possessory interest in land as well as 
~b~~k· . ~ b - ~~ "property 1n the fullest sense of that term," W1l ur v • 
. ~f United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 317 ( 1930) , 
;wv""" . ~ 
~~~ the government cannot argue that the FLPMA simply redefines 
~~~f. - the underlying property interest to make it contingent on 
yearly filings. Such a radical redefinition would, to my 
mind, amount to an uncompensated taking . The government 
.---? 
~ ~ { can regain a mining claim without payment through two 
~~ means: ~nd forfeiture Abandonment consists of 
~_,);t ~aimholder 's "subjective intent to abandon coupled 
~~with an external and objective act by which that intent is 
~6-~? ~ ~ carried into effect." 2 Am. Law of Mining § 8 • 1 A ( 19 8 3 ) • 
~ Forfeiture, on the other hand, consists of the ----v ~ claimholder 's failure to fulfill some condition upon which 
the claim was originally conditioned, such as continuing 
assessment work on the property. Id., at §8.7C. Since the 
filing requirements were imposed after the appees gained 
their interest, the government cannot argue that failure to 
file properly amounted to a forfeiture. The filing re--
quirements must be judged according to whether they reason- / 
ably indicate whether an actual abandonment occurred ~ 
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 516 _)1982), 
this Court considered the constitutionality of an Indiana 
statute which provided that a severed mineral interest that 
is not used for 20 years automatically lapses and reverts 
to the surface owner of the property unless the mineral 
owner files a statement of claim in the local county re-
corder's office. The "use" of a mineral interest that was 
sufficient to preclude its extinction included the actual 
or attempted production of minerals, the payment of rents 
or royalties, and any payment of taxes. The Court upheld 
the statute on the ground that "the State has the power to 
condition the permanent retention of [a) property right on 
the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a 
present intention to retain the interest." Id., at 526 
(emphasis added). The reason why such conditions pose no 
due process problems is that, once a claim has been aban-
doned, the owner retains no interest for due process to --
protect. Thus, requiring the performance of certain condi---tions is constitutionally permissible so long as those con-
di tions are reasonable in themselves and not performing 
them can reasonably be seen as evidence of an intent to 
abandon or at least of lack of intent to retain. 
The Texaco test thus has two prongs: ( i) are the 
conditions reasonable ones to expect claimholders to per-
form and (ii) do the conditions provide reasonably reliable 
indicia of intent. The Court in Texaco largely assumed 
that the filing requirements were reasonable to perform. 
However, the dissent, which you joined, attacked the major-
ity's belief that it was reasonable to assume abandonment 
under the circumstances. The majority replied: 
"We do not believe • . • that the State's assump-
tion of abandonment in these cases is improper. 
[T)he length of the period that is afforded 
to a mineral owner to use the interest, the vari-
ety and minimal extent of the actions that con-
stitute a statutory use, and the length of the 
statutory grace period are sufficient to entitle 
the State to indulge in the assumption that--if 
no statutory use is made in a 20-year period and 
no statement of claim is filed ••• --the mineral 
owner has abandoned the property. We need not 
decide today whether the State may indulge in a 
similar assumption in cases in which the statu-
tory period of nonuse is shorter than that in-
volved here, or in which the interest affected is 
such that concepts of 'use' or 'nonuse' have lit-
tle meaning." 454 u.s., at 535 n.28 (emphasis 
added) . 
In reaching its decision, the Texaco Court applied 
a general due process "fairness" approach and avoided both 
the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine and the Mathews v. 
Eldrige calculus. Which approach one takes matters little, 
however, for in this context the Texaco, irrebuttable pre-
sumption, and Mathews v. Eldridge approaches are all basi-
cally the same. Insofar as is relevant here, each weighs 
the reasonableness of the conditions and their reliability 
as evidence of intent to abandon against the administrative 
problems that would be encountered if other procedures, 
particularly hearings, were required. There are two ques- r~t;;_5' 
tions, then, at issue: ~how reasonable is the statutory 
assumption that claims not covered by a proper yearly fil-
ing have been abandoned and @ would requiring further 
procedures ensure more accurate abandonment determinations 
without creating an administrative nightmare? The law of-
fers no answers to these questions. One must turn instead 
to commonsense and one's own notion of reasonableness. ---- .__ 
In the present case, the first issue presents the 
question the Court left unanswered in Texaco. The statute 
in that case conclusively presumed abandonment after 20 
years of nonuse. Section 314, on the other hand, conclu-
sively presumes abandonment from a failure to make a proper 
d-
~ 
yearly filing. This assumption strikes me as much less ~ 
reasonable than the one in Texaco. Not only is the period 
~-----------~~--,----------~--
of time significantly shorter but also the claimholders in 
the present case had given affirmative notice just a year 
before that they intended to retain their interest. Per-
haps the best way of thinking about the reasonableness of 
this period is to compare it to analogous adverse posses-~ 
sion periods, as this Court did in Texaco. Allowing 
adverse possessor to obtain title after only a year might 
well rise to the level of a due process violation. I would 
certainly be uncomfortable about such a law. 
;,, 




The second question is more difficult and open to 
more debate. On the one hand, a hearing would allow a much 
more accurate determination of whether a claim has actually~~ 
been abandoned. Of this there can be little doubt. On the 
other hand, holding hearings in all cases would create an 
administrative burden of huge proportions. According to 
appees and some amici, the number of people who have fallen 
afoul of the yearly filing requirement is great. I wonder, ~ d...D 9 
however, how many hearings would actually be necessary. 
Since the BLM now accepts a yearly filing as evidence of 
intent to retain an interest in a claim, it could largely 
~~~~<  avoid hearings by instituting appropriate summary proce--/A~Sl!!iii!!!l--'1411.1 ....,1 _ 
dures based on similar evidence. Requiring a hearing 
could, in fact, mean only that the claimholders would have 
to get a second notice informing them of their right to a 
hearing. If they did not respond, the government could 
terminate their interest without a hearing on the basis of 
little evidence. Perhaps failure to respond to the notice 
could be enough evidence by itself. If a claimholder did 
ask for a hearing, the BLM could either hold one if it felt 
a claim had been actually abandoned or, if not, treat the 
request itself as evidence of intent to retain the posses-
sory interest. 
To judge the fairness and practicality of such a 
system, we must consider four different classes of 
claimholders who miss the yearly deadline: (i) those who 
-----------~ 
_ __............ 
have actually abandoned their claims but ask for a hearing, 
.. 
. ' 
(ii) those who have abandoned their claims and do not ask 
for one, (iii) those who have not actually abandoned their 
claims and ask for a hearing, and (iv) those who have not 
abandoned their claims and do not ask for one. Those in 
categories (ii) and (iv) would forfeit their interests but 
only after receiving an opportunity for a hearing. Their 
failure to take advantage of it creates no unfairness. 
Those, like appees, in category (iii) could retain their 
interest without going through a full hearing unless the 
BLM had some legitimate doubt as to abandonment. In most 
cases, the BLM could use summary procedures to hold against 
abandonment on the basis of some showing of continuing in-
tent to possess. Those in category (i) pose the problem, 
for the government could not disposses them of their claim 
without holding a full hearing. The only question is 
whether the increased certainty that the procedure adds to 
all determinations is worth the cost in this one category. 
I believe it is, but reasonable men could well differ. 
Appees make the final argument that even if there 
is no due process problem with the §314 presumption, sub-
stantial compliance should be accepted. This argument is a 
non-starter for several reasons. First, the language of 
§314 is clear. It requires filing "prior to December 31" 
of each year, not filing on or a reasonable time after that 
date. Allowing substantial compliance here would cast into 
doubt the absoluteness of most statutory time requirements. 
Furthermore, the regs promulgated pursuant to §314 make the 
, .. 
strictness of the deadline clear: "The failure to file an 
instrument required by §§3833.1-2(a), and 3833.2-1 of this 
title within the time periods prescribed therein, shall be 
deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the 
mining claim and it shall be void." 43 C.F.R. 
§3833.4(a). Nothing suggests that this reg is invalid. 
III. Conclusion. 
Since an unpatented mining claim constitutes an 
ordinary possessory interest in land, the government cannot 
regain that interest without paying compensation ~ss the 
the claimholder has abandoned or forfeited it. And there 
is no question of forfeiture here. The question, then, is 
whether presuming abandonment from a failure to make a 
<---- --
timely yearly filing violates due process. Whether judged 
according to the general procedural due process approach 
this Court employed in Texaco, its "irrebuttable presump-
tion" analysis, or the Mathews v. Eldridge due process cal-
culus, the answer depends on the same two issues ~oes a 
failure to make a~ly~arly filing reasonably evidence 
an intent to aban~n~ould alternative procedures more 
1\1 
accurately determine this intent without being 
impracticable? I believe the answer to the first question 
is "no." One year is just too short a period of time on 
which to base such an assumption, especially since the 
claimholders have affirmatively indicated their intent to 
retain the interest only a year before in their last yearly 
filing. I believe the ans-wer to the second question is 
"yes." Although the specter of hearings in every case cer-
'---.... 
tainly presents an administrative nightmare, in practice 
very few hearings would need to be held. Accordingly, I 
would find a violation of due process. ~: ~~4'r-t 
It is important to realize how much of the statu-
tory scheme such a holding would affect. First, it would 
not affect BLM findings that those claimholders who failed 
to make a proper initial filing within the three-year grace 
period allowed by the statute abandoned their claims. This -initial requirement not only is not questioned in the 
-----~--------------~ 
present case but also is different in several respects: (i) 
its three-year period is more reasonable: ( i i) failure to 
make a proper initial filing is not preceded only a year 
before by any affirmative showing of an intent to retain 
possession: and (iii) the government's interest in removing 
cloud on these stale claims is stronger. Second , this 
holding would not affect mining claims located after enact-
ment of the FLPMA. Since Congress can always condition new 
grants on whatever requirements it wishes, failure to make 
proper yearly filings as to these would constitute a valid 
forfeiture. Abandonment would not even be an issue. Thus, 
for these two reasons, the sweep of the holding I propose 
would be somewhat limited. 
IV. Recommendation 
I recommend affirming the judgment of the DC . 
.. ~ 
f. ~~ 
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November 15, 1984 
83-1394 United States v. Locke 
Dear John: 
As you and I voted to affirm in this case, I would 
appreciate vour writing a dissent along the lines that per-
suaded me to agree with you. 
As you know, I also think there is a serious pro-
cedural due process issue - a view that Sandra shares. Her 
vote, however, was tentatively to reverse. If she should 
conclude to write on the due process issue and affirm on 
that basis, I may also join her or say that if it were nec-
essary to reach the constitutional issue I would agree. I 





cc: Justice O'Connor 
T' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
j;npunu <lJo-url o-f tlf~ 'Jt{nit~lt j;tat~g 
._aglfingron. ~. <lJ. 21lbT'1~ 
November 15, 1984 
Re: 83-1394 - United States v. Locke 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: Justice O'Connor 
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CHAMI3ERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
..iuprtmt Qfttttrl 1tf tlrt ~tb .,iWtg 
._asfti:n:ghm. ~. <ij. 211~~~ 
January 25, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1394 United States v. Locke 
Dear Thurgood, 
I agree with most of your op1n1on and of course with the 
result, but I do not agree with the manner in which you have 
treated our "irrebuttable presumption" cases in your 
footnote 16, and I have some reservation about the sweep of 
your footnote 12 discussing the rather complicated subject 









JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.tn.prtutt Q}ourt ltf l4t ~ittb .ttalt.e' 
Jlu-lfinglon, Jl. (!}. 21l?ll~ 
January 25, 1985 
/ 
re: 83-1394 United States et al. v. Madison D. Locke, et al. 
Dear Thurgood, 
For the present I will await further writing 
in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.hJn"tmt <qourt .n tlft ~a .itatt• 
-u~ J). <q. 21l?'l' 
Re: No. 83-1394 - United States v. Locke 
Dear Thurgood: 
January 28, 1985 
Would you consider eliminating footnote 16 on page 21? If 
you see your way clear to make this change, you have my joinder. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
,, 
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January 28, 1985 
Re: 83-1394 - United States v. Locke 
Dear Thurgood: 
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From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: __ J_A_N_2_9_19_8_5 __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1394 
UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MADISON 
D. LOCKE ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
[January-, 1985] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The primary question presented by this appeal is whether 
the Constitution prevents Congress from providing that hold-
ers of unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with the 
annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744, shall 
forfeit their claims. 
I 
From the enactment of the general mining laws in the nine-
teenth century until1976, those who sought to make their liv-
ing by locating and developing minerals on federal lands were 
virtually unconstrained by the fetters of federal control. 
The general mining laws, 30 U.S. C. §22 et seq., still in 
effect today, allow United States citizens to go onto unappro-
priated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop 
certain minerals. "Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed 
by the minimal procedures required to formally "locate" the 
deposit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession 
of the land for mining purposes, 30 U. S. C. § 26; as long as 
$100 of assessment work is performed ann ly, the individ-
ual may continue to extract and sell mi als from the claim 
without paying any royalty to the Uni d States, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 28. For a nominal sum, and afte certain statutory condi-
tions are fulfilled, an individu may patent the claim, 
&eel -fw JDff;"'J L,,-s J.- «5<;iovt 1-1ke- llreLAf-"'-L/e 
pre5<-~w.f~ev, JoJ.i~e_ 
1 
Jc.~ c /C1c;fsl.JW ~ f1# 1L ~ 
~vtls~ i;~ L'-v!c,~:Je l <ecow.w.cv,J w~;+;"''j ~ ;J:.,~:h·ce__ 
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thereby purchasing from the federal government the land 
and minerals and obtaining ultimate title to them. Patent-
ing, however, is not required, and an unpatented mining 
claim remains a fully recognized possessory interest. Best v. 
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335 (1963). 
By the 1960s, it had become clear that this nineteenth cen-
tury laissez faire regime had created virtual chaos with re-
spect to the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that 
more than six million unpatented mining claims existed on 
public lands other than the national forests; in addition, more 
than half the land in the National Forest System was thought 
to be covered by such claims. S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 
(1975). Many of these claims had been dormant for decades, 
and many were invalid for other reasons, but in the absence 
of a federal recording system, no simple way existed for 
determining which public lands were subject to mining loca-
tions, and whether those locations were valid or invalid. 
Ibid. As a result, federal land managers had to proceed 
slowly and cautiously in taking any action affecting federal 
land lest the federal property rights of claimants be unlaw-
fully disturbed. Each time the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) proposed a sale or other conveyance of federal land, a 
title search in the county recorder's office was necessary; if 
an outstanding mining claim was found, no matter how stale 
or apparently abandoned, formal administrative adjudication 
was required to determine the validity of the claim. 1 
After more than a decade of studying this problem in the 
context of a broader inquiry into the proper management of 
the public lands in the modern era, Congress in 1976 enacted 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 
94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U. S. C. §§ 1701-1784). 
Section 314 of the Act establishes a federal recording system 
that is designed both to rid federal lands of stale mining 
claims and to provide federal land managers with up-to-date 
1 See generally Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of 
Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219. 
83-1394-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. LOCKE 3 
information that allows them to make informed and expe-
ditious land management decisions. For claims located be-
fore FLPMA's enactment, 2 the federal recording system 
imposes two requirements. First, the claims must initially 
be recorded with the BLM by filing, within three years of 
FLPMA's enactment, a copy of the official record of the 
notice or certificate of location. 90 Stat. 2743, § 314(b); 43 
U. S. C. § 1744(b). Second, every year after the initial re-
cording, and "prior to December 31," the claimant must file 
with BLM a notice of intention to hold the claim or an affida-
vit of assessment work performed on the claim. 90 Stat. 
2743, §314(a); 43 U.S. C. §1744(a). Section 314(c) of the 
Act provides that failure to comply with either of these re-
quirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the mining claim . .. by the owner." 43 
U. S. C. § 1744(c). 
The second of these requirements-the annual filing ob-
ligation-has created the dispute underlying this appeal. 
Appellees, four individuals "engaged in the business of 
operating mining properties in Nevada,'' 3 purchased in 1960 
and 1966 ten unpatented mining claims on public lands near 
Ely, Nevada. These claims were major sources of gravel 
and building material: the claims are valued at several million 
dollars, 4 and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, appel-
lees' gross income totalled more than one million dollars. 5 
Throughout the period during which they owned the claims, 
appellees complied with annual state law filing and assess-
ment work requirements. In addition, appellees satisfied 
FLPMA's initial recording requirement by properly filing 
2 A somewhat different scheme applies to claims located after October 
21, 1976, the date the Act was passed. 
8 Plaintiff's Complaint 112. 
• Plaintiff's Complaint 1115. 
5 Locke v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (1983). From 1960 to 
1980, total gross income from the claims exceeded four million dollars. 
Ibid. 
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with BLM a notice of location, thereby putting their claims 
on record for purposes of FLPMA. 
At the end of 1980, however, appellees failed to meet on 
time their first annual FLPMA filing obligation, for appellees 
waited until December 31 to submit to BLM the annual notice 
of intent to hold or proof of assessment work performed re-
quired under section 314(a) ofFLPMA, 43 U. S. C.§ 1744(a). 
As noted above, that section requires these documents to be 
filed annually "prior to December 31." Had appellees 
checked, they would further have discovered that BLM regu-
lations made quite clear that claimants were required to 
make the annual filings in the proper BLM office "on or be-
fore December 30 of each calender year." 43 CFR § 3833.2-
1(a) (1980) (current version at 43 CFR 3833.2-1(b)(1). Thus, 
appellees' filing was one day too late. 
This fact was brought painfully home to appellees when 
they received a letter from the BLM Nevada State Office in-
forming them that their claims had been declared abandoned 
and void due to the failure to file, prior to December 31, 1980, 
a notice of intent to hold or an affidavit of assessment work 
performed. In many cases, loss of a claim in this way would 
have minimal practical effect; the claimant could simply 
locate the same claim again and then rerecord it with BLM. 
In this case, however, relocation of appellees' claims, which 
were initially located by appellees' predecessors in 1952 and 
1954, was prohibited by the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 
30 U. S. C. § 611; that Act prospectively barred location of 
the sort of minerals yielded by appellees' claims. Appellees' 
mineral deposits thus escheated to the Government. 
After losing an administrative appeal, appellees filed the 
present action in the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada. Their complaint alleged, inter alia, that 
§ 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property 
without just compensation and denied them due process. On 
summary judgment, the District Court held that § 314(c) did 
indeed deprive appellees of the process to which they were 
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constitutionally due. The District Court reasoned that 
§ 314(c) created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption 
that claimants who failed to make a timely filing intended to 
abandon their claims. Rather than relying on this presump-
tion, the Government was obliged, in the District Court's 
view, to provide individualized notice to claimants that their 
claims were in danger of being lost, followed by a post-filing 
deadline hearing at which the claimants could demonstrate 
that they had not, in fact, abandoned a claim. Alternatively, 
the District Court held that the one-day late filing "substan-
tially complied" with the Act and regulations. 
Because a District Court had held an Act of Congress un-
constitutional in a civil suit to which the United States was 
a party, we noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252. -- U. S. -- (1984). 6 We now reverse. 
II 
Appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 brings before this Court 
not merely the constitutional question decided below, but the 
entire case. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31 
(1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 27 n. 7 (1960). 
The entire case includes nonconstitutional questions actually 
decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional 
grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court. 
United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27-28 (1979). 7 These 
6 That the District Court decided the case on both constitutional and 
statutory grounds does not affect this Court's obligation under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252 to take jurisdiction over the case; as long as the unconstitutionality 
of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of decision below in a civil suit 
to which the United States is a party, appeal lies directly to this Court. 
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 541 (1939). 
Another District Court in the West similarly has declared section 314(c) 
unconstitutional with respect to invalidation of claims based on failure to 
meet the initial recordation requirements of § 314(a) in timely fashion. 
Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1982). 
7 When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by the 
lower court, we may vacate the decision below and remand with instruc-
tions that those questions be decided, see Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 
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principles are important aids in the prudential exercise of our 
appellate jurisdiction, for when a case arrives here by appeal 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, this Court will not pass on the con-
stitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the 
Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground 
fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be 
avoided. See Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S. --, --
(1984); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974); 
cf. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
335 U. S. 106, 110 (1948) (appeals under former Criminal Ap-
peals Act); see generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(1936). Thus, we turn first to the nonconstitutional ques-
tions pressed below. 
III 
A 
Before the District Court, appellees asserted that the sec-
tion 314(a) requirement of a filing "prior to December 31 of 
each year" should be construed to require a filing "on or be-
fore December 31." Thus, appellees argued, their Decem-
ber 31 filing had in fact complied with the statute, and the 
BLM had acted ultra vires in voiding their claims. 
Although the District Court did not address this argument, 
the argument raises a question sufficiently legal in nature 
that we choose to address it even in the absence of lower 
court analysis. See, e. g., United States v. Clark, supra. 
It is clear to us that the plain language of the statute simply 
cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on it. As even 
appellees conceded at oral argument, § 314(a) "is a statement 
that Congress wanted it filed by December 30th. I think 
that is a clear statement ... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see also 
231 (1976), or we may choose to decide those questions ourselves without 
benefit of lower court analysis, see United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23 
(1979). The choice between these options depends on the extent to which 
lower court factfinding and analysis of the nonconstitutional questions will 
be necessary or useful to our disposition of those questions. 
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id., at 37 ("A literal reading of the statute would require a 
December 30th filing . . . . "). While we will not allow a 
literal reading of a statute to produce a result "demonstrably 
at odds with the intentions of its drafters," Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982), with respect to 
filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress' words is gener-
ally the only proper reading of those words. To attempt to 
decide whether some date other than the one set out in the 
statute is the date actually "intended" by Congress is to set 
sail on an aimless journey, for the purpose of a filing deadline 
would be just as well served by nearly any date a court might 
choose as by the date Congress has in fact set out in the stat-
ute. "Actual purpose is sometimes unknown," U. S. Rail-
road Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 180 (STE-
VENS, J., concurring), and such is the case with filing 
deadlines; as might be expected, nothing in the legislative 
history suggests why Congress chose December 30 over 
December 31, or over September 1 (the end of the assess-
ment year for mining claims, 30 U. S. C. § 28), as the last day 
on which the required filings could be made. But "[d]ead-
lines are inherently arbitrary," while fixed dates "are often 
essential to accomplish necessary results." United States v. 
Boyle,- U.S.--,- (1984). Faced with the inher-
ent arbitrariness of filing deadlines, we must, at least in a 
civil case, apply by its terms the date fixed by the statute. 
Cf. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz , 449 
u. s. 166, 179 (1980). 8 
8 Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of 
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392-398 (1982). Whether this general principle 
applies to deadlines that run in favor of the Government is a question on 
which we express no opinion today. In addition, no showing has been 
made that appellees were in any way "unable to exercise the usual care and 
diligence" that would have allowed them to meet the filing deadline or to 
learn of its existence. See United States v. Boyle, - U. S. -, -
(BRENNAN, J., concurring). Of course, at issue in Boyle was an explicit 
provision in the Internal Revenue Code that provided a reasonable cause 
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Moreover, BLM regulations have made absolutely clear 
since the enactment of FLPMA that "prior to December 31" 
means what it says. As the current version of the filing 
regulations states: 
The owner of an unpatented mining claim located on 
Federal lands ... shall have filed or caused to have been 
filed on or before December 30 of each calendar year . . . 
evidence of annual assessment work performed during 
the previous assessment year or a notice of intention to 
hold the mining claim. 43 CFR § 3833.2-1. 
See also 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1982) (same); 43 CFR 
3833.2-1(a) (1981) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1 (a) (1980) (same); 
43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1979) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a)(1) 
(1978) ("prior to" Dec. 31); 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a)(1) (1977) 
("prior to" Dec. 31). Leading mining treatises similarly in-
form claimants that "[i]t is important to note that the filing of 
a notice of intention or evidence of assessment work must be 
done prior to December 31 of each year, i. e, on or before 
December 30." 2 American Law of Mining§ 7.23D, at 150.2 
(1983) (emphasis in original); see also 23 Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Institute 25 (1977) (same). If appellees, who 
were businessmen involved in the running of a major mining 
operation for more than 20 years, had any questions about 
whether a December 31 filing complied with the statute, it 
was incumbent upon them, as it is upon other businessmen, 
see United States v. Boyle, supra, to have checked the regu-
lations or to have consulted an attorney for legal advice. 
Pursuit of either of these courses, rather than the submission 
of a last-minute filing, would surely have led appellees to the 
conclusion that December 30 was the last day on which they 
could file safely. 
In so saying, we are not insensitive to the problems posed 
by congressional reliance on the words "prior to December 
exception to the Code's filing deadlines, while FLPMA contains no analo-
gous provision. 
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31;" in the absence of agency regulations, the congressional 
language might well have become an unintended trap for the 
unwary who, upon a cursory reading of the statute, could 
have been misled into thinking that the filing must simply be 
made by the end of the year. But the agency regulations 
clarify and confirm the import of the statutory language by 
making clear that the annual filings must be made on or be-
fore December 30. These regulations provide a conclusive 
answer to appellees' claim, for where the language of a filing 
deadline is plain and the agency's construction completely 
consistent with that language, the agency's construction sim-
ply cannot be found "sufficiently unreasonable" as to be unac-
ceptable. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Com-
mittee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981). 
We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of dis-
ingenuous evasion" even to avoid a constitutional question. 
Moore Ice Cream v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1932) (Car-
dozo, J.). 9 We therefore hold that BLM did not act ultra 
vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely. 
B 
Section 314(c) states that failure to comply with the filing 
requirements of§§ 314(a) and 314(b) "shall be deemed conclu-
sively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim." 
We must next consider whether this provision expresses a 
9 We note that the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions that 
require action "prior to" some date, including at least 15 provisions that 
contemplate action "prior to December 31," and it would be disingenuous 
indeed to hold that Congress meant all of these provisions, or some eclectic 
selection of them, to read "on" rather n " rior to." See 7 U. S. 
§609(b)(5); 12 u.s. c. § 170 . 12 u.s. c. § 1823(g); 12 u.s. c. 
§ 1841(a)(5)(A); ?UJ. S. C. § 37 (c); 26 U. S. C. § 503 (d)(1); 33 U. S. C. 
§1319(a)(5)(B); 42 U.S. C. §415(a)(1)(c)(ii); 42 U.S. C. §1692-17(b); 42 
U. S. C. § 5614(b)(5); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2); 42 U. S. C. § 7521(b)(2); 43 
U.S. C. § 1744(a); 50 U. S.C, App. §41; 50 U.S. C., App. § 1741. In 
addition, Congress knows how to make explicit an intent to allow action on 
December 31 when it employs a December 31 date in a statute. See, e. g., 
7 u. s. c. § 609(b)(2); 22 u. s. c. § 3303; 43 u. s. c. § 256. 
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congressional intent to extinguish all claims for which filings 
have not been made, or only those claims for which filings 
have not been made and for which the claimants have a spe-
cific intent to abandon the claim. The District Court 
adopted the latter interpretation, and on that basis concluded 
that § 314(c) created a constitutionally impermissible 
irrebuttable presumption of abandonment. The District 
Court reasoned that, once Congress had chosen to make loss 
of a claim turn on the specific intent of the claimant, a prior 
hearing and findings on the claimant's intent were constitu-
tionally required before the claim of a non-filing claimant 
could be extinguished. 
In concluding that Congress was concerned with the spe-
cific intent of the claimant even when the claimant had failed 
to make the required filings, the District Court began from 
the fact that neither § 314(c) nor the Act itself defines the 
term "abandonment" as that term appears in § 314(c). The 
District Court then noted correctly that the common law of 
mining traditionally has drawn a distinction between "aban-
donment" of a claim, which occurs only upon a showing of the 
claimant's intent to relinquish the claim, and "forfeiture" of a 
claim, for which only noncompliance with the requirements of 
law must be shown. See, e. g., 2 American Law of Mining 
§ 8.2, at 195-196 (1983) (relied upon by the District Court). 
Given that Congress had not expressly stated in the statute 
any intent to depart from the term-of-art meaning of "aban-
donment" at common law, the District Court concluded that 
§ 314(c) was intended to incorporate the traditional common-
law distinction between abandonment and forfeiture. Thus, 
reasoned the District Court, Congress did not intend to cause 
a forfeiture of claims for which the required filings had not 
been made, but rather to focus on the claimant's actual in-
tent. As a corollary, the District Court understood the fail-
ure to file to have been intended to be merely one piece of 
evidence in a factual inquiry into whether a claimant had a 
specific intent to abandon his property. 
·' 
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This construction of the statutory scheme cannot withstand 
analysis. While reference to common-law conceptions is 
often a helpful guide to interpreting open-ended or undefined 
statutory terms, see, e. g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 
U. S. 322, 329 (1981); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 
U. S. 1, 59 (1910), this principle is a guide to legislative in-
tent, not a talisman of it, and the principle is not to be applied 
in defiance of a statute's overriding purposes and logic. Al-
though § 314(c) is couched in terms of a conclusive presump-
tion of "abandonment," there can be little doubt that Con-
gress intended § 314(c) to cause a forfeiture of all claims for 
which the filing requirements of§§ 314(a) and 314(b) had not 
been met. 
To begin with, the Senate version of§ 314(c) provided that 
any claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to be abandoned and shall be void." S. 507, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess., -- Cong. Rec. S2371 (Feb. 25, 1976). 10 
The Committee Report accompanying S. 507 repeatedly indi-
cated that failure to comply with the filing requirements 
would make a claim "void." SeeS. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65, 
66 (1975). The House legislation and reports merely repeat 
the statutory language without offering any explanation of it, 
but it is clear from the Conference Committee Report that 
the undisputed intent of the Senate-to make "void" those 
claims for which proper filings were not timely made-was 
the intent of both chambers. The Report stated: "Both the 
Senate bill and House amendments provided for recordation 
of mining claims and for extinguishment of abandonded 
claims." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 62 
(1976) (emphasis added). 
10 The Senate bill required only initial recordings, not annual filings, but 
this factor is not significant in light of the actions of the Conference Com-
mittee; the clear structure of the Senate bill was to impose the sanction of 
claim extinguishment on those who failed to make whatever filings federal 
law required. 
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In addition, the District Court's construction fails to give 
effect to the "conclusive presumption" language of § 314(c). 
If the failure to file merely shifts the burden to the claimant 
to prove that he intends to keep the claim, then nothing "con-
clusive" is achieved by § 314(c). The District Court sought 
to avoid this conclusion by holding that § 314(c) does extin-
guish automatically those claims for which initial recordings, 
as opposed to annual filings, have not been made; the District 
Court attempted to justify its distinction between initial re-
cordings and annual filings on the ground that the dominant 
purpose of § 314(c) was to avoid forcing BLM to the "awe-
some task of searching every local title record" to establish 
initially a federal recording system. 573 F. Supp. 472, 477, 
(D. Nev. 1983). Once this purpose had been satisfied by an 
initial recording, the primary purposes of the conclusive pre-
sumption, in the District Court's view, had been met. But 
the clear language of§ 314(c) admits of no distinction between 
initial recordings and annual filings: failure to do either "shall 
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment." 
And the District Court's analysis of the purposes of§ 314( c) is 
also misguided, for the annual filing requirements serve a 
purpose similar to that of the initial recording requirement; 
millions of claims undoubtedly have now been recorded, and 
the presence of an annual filing obligation allows BLM to 
keep the system established in § 314 up to date on a yearly 
basis. To put the burden on BLM to keep this system cur-
rent through its own inquiry into the status of recorded 
claims would lead to a situation similar to that which led Con-
gress initially to make the federal recording system self-
executing. The purposes of a self-executing recording sys-
tem are implicated similarly, if somewhat less substantially, 
by the annual filing obligation as by the initial recording 
requirement, and the District Court was not empowered to 
thwart these purposes or the clear language of § 314(c) by 
concluding that § 314(c) was actually concerned with only ini-
tial recordings. 
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For these reasons, we find that Congress intended in 
§ 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which timely filings 
were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is 
simply made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time, 
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. See Western Min-
ing Council v. Watt, 643 F. 2d 619, 628 (CA9 1981). 
c 
A final statutory question must be resolved before we turn 
to the constitutional holding of the District Court. Relying 
primarily on Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., 400 U. S. 48 (1970), the 
District Court held that, even if the statute required a filing 
on or before December 30, appellees had "substantially com-
plied" by filing on December 31. We cannot accept this view l 
of the statute. 
The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by 
filing sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the 
least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting 
principle. If one-day late filings are acceptable, ten-day late 
filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of 
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing 
deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some 
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it. Filing 
deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate 
harshly and arbitrarily with respect to the individuals who 
fall just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing 
deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be en-
forced. "Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a 
lax attitude toward filing dates," United States v. Boyle, 
-- U. S. --, - (1984). A filing deadline cannot be 
complied with, substantially or otherwise, by filing late-
even by one day. 
Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., supra, does not support a contrary 
conclusion. Hickel suggested, although it did not hold, that 
failure to meet the annual assessment work requirements of 
the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §28, which require that 
83-1394-0PINION 
14 UNITED STATES v. LOCKE 
"not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or 
improvements made during each year," would not render a 
claim automatically void. Instead, if an individual complied 
substantially but not fully with the requirement, he might 
under some circumstances be able to retain possession of his 
claim. 
These suggestions in Hickel do not afford a safe haven to 
mine owners who fail to meet their filing obligations under 
any federal mining law. Failure to comply fully with the 
physical requirement that a certain amount of work be per-
formed each year is significantly different from the complete 
failure to file on time documents that federal law commands 
be filed. In addition, the general mining laws at issue in 
Hickel do not clearly provide that a claim will be lost for fail-
ure to meet the assessment work requirements. Thus, it 
was open to the Court to conclude in Hickel that Congress 
had intended to make the assessment work requirement 
merely an indicia of a claimant's specific intent to retain a 
claim. Full compliance with the assessment work require-
ments would establish conclusively an intent to keep the 
claim, but less than full compliance would not by force of law 
operate to deprive the claimant of his claim. Instead, less 
than full compliance would subject the mine owner to a case-
by-case determination of whether he nonetheless intended to 
keep his claim. See Hickel, supra, at 56-57. 
In this case, the statute explicitly provides that failure to 
comply with the applicable filing requirements leads auto-
matically to loss of the claim. See supra Part liB. Thus, 
Congress has made it unnecessary to ascertain whether the 
individual in fact intends to abandon the claim, and there is 
no room to inquire whether substantial compliance is indica-
tive of the claimant's intent-intent is simply irrelevant if the 
required filings are not made. Hickel's discussion of sub-
stantial compliance is therefore inapposite to the statutory 
scheme at issue here. As a result, Hickel gives miners no 
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greater latitude with filing deadlines than have other 
individuals. 11 
IV 
Much of the District Court's constitutional discussion, 
predicated as it was on the view that § 314(c) is concerned 
with the claimant's actual intent, necessarily falls with our 
conclusion that § 314(c) automatically deems forfeited those 
claims for which the required filings are not timely made. 
Nonetheless, there are suggestions in the District Court's 
opinion that, even understood as a forfeiture provision, 
§ 314(c) might be unconstitutional. We therefore go on to 
consider whether automatic forfeiture of a claim for failure to 
make annual filings is constitutionally permissible. The 
framework for analysis of this question, in both its substan-
tive and procedural dimensions, is set forth by our recent 
decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982). 
There we upheld a state statute pursuant to which a severed 
mineral interest that had not been used for a period of 20 
years automatically lapsed and reverted to the current sur-
face owner of the property, unless the mineral owner filed a 
statement of claim in the county recorder's office within two 
years of the statute's passage. 
Under Texaco, we must first address the question of af-
firmative legislative power: whether Congress is authorized 
to "provide that property rights of this character shall be 
extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative ac-
11 Since 1982, BLM regulations have provided that filings due on or 
before December 30 will be considered timely if postmarked on or before 
December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on the follow-
ing January 19th. 43 CFR 3833. 0-5(m) (1983). Appellees view this regu-
lation as validating "substantial compliance" with the filing requirements. 
Even had this regulation been in effect at the time appellees filed in 1980, 
we would not be able to agree with appellees' view; that an agency has 
decided to take account of holiday mail delays by treating as timely filed a 
document postmarked on the statutory filing date does not in any way sug-
gest that the agency has adopted a general policy of waiving the statutory 
filing requirements. 
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tion required by the" statute. I d., at 516. As a matter of 
federal law, an unpatented mining claim properly discovered 
and located on federal land is, of course, "property in the 
fullest sense of that term." Wilbur v. United States ex rel. 
Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306, 317 (1930); see also Best v. Hum-
boldt Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335-336 (1963); Cameron v. 
United States, 252 U. S. 450, 460-461 (1920). Nonetheless, 
legislatures clearly have the power to impose new regulatory 
constraints on the way in which existing property rights are 
used, or to condition continued retention of an existing prop-
erty right on the performance of certain affirmative duties, 
as long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable re-
striction designed to further legitimate legislative objectives. 
See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U. S. 365 
(1926); Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90, 94 (1897); Vance v. 
Vance 108 U. S. 514, 517 (1883); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 
628 (1877). "[L]egislation adjusting rights and burdens is 
not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expec-
tations." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 
1, 15-16 (1976) (citations omitted). 
In this case, there can be no doubt that Congress, acting 
pursuant to its broad regulatory powers over the use and 
occupancy of the public lands, see, e. g., Kleppe v. New Mex-
ico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976), could condition initial receipt of 
an unpatented mining claim upon an agreement to perform 
annual assessment work and make annual filings. That this 
requirement was applied to claims already located by the 
time FLPMA was enacted, and thus might, in some sense, be 
viewed as retroactive, does not alter the analysis, for any 
"retroactive application of [FLPMA] is supported by a legiti-
mate legislative purpose furthered by rational means .... " 
PBSC v. R. A. Gray & Co., - U. S. - (1984). The 
purposes of applying FLPMA's filing provisions to claims 
located before the Act was passed-to rid federal lands of 
stale mining claims and to provide for centralized collection 
by federal land managers of comprehensive and up-to-date in-
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fonnation on the status of recorded but unpatented mining 
claims-are clearly legitimate. In addition, § 314(c) is a rea-
sonable, if severe, means of furthering these goals; sanction-
ing with loss of their claims those claimants who fail to file 
provides a powerful motivation to comply with the filing re-
quirements, while automatic invalidation for noncompliance 
enables federal land managers to know with certainty and 
ease whether a claim is currently valid. Finally, the restric-
tion attached to the continued retention of a mining claim im-
poses the most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must 
simply file a paper once a year indicating that the required 
assessment work has been perfonned or that they intend to 
hold the claim. 12 As a result, Congress was well within its 
12 Appellees suggest that Texaco further requires that the restriction 
imposed be substantively reasonable in the sense that it adequately relate 
to some common law conception of the nature of the property right in-
volved. Thus, appellees point to the fact that, in Texaco, failure to file 
could produce a forfeiture only if, in addition, the mineral interest had lain 
dormant for 20 years; according to appellees, conjunction of a 20-year dor-
mancy period with failure to file a statement of claim sufficiently indicated 
abandonment, as that term is understood at common law, to justify the 
statute. 
Appellees misperceive the nature of property in our modem cases. In 
the regulation of private property rights, the legislature's substantive 
power is not constrained by the brooding omnipresence of common-law 
conceptions regarding the "inherent" nature or scope of the property right 
involved. Compare Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 21 (1915) with 
Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 187 (1941) (overruling Coppage); 
see also Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 467 ("What is the evi-
dence of an individual having abandoned his rights or property? It is clear 
that the subject is one over which every community is at liberty to make a 
rule for itself"). Instead, property rights are defined by the reasonable 
expectations an individual legitimately holds with regard to the extent to 
which legislative action will alter his right. Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York, 438 U. S. 104, 125 (1978). Because legislation by its 
very function alters the status quo, it is unreasonable to expect that, once a 
property right is obtained, its use will never be qualified by subsequent 
legislative action; "in the interest of the community, [government may] 
limit one [right] that others may be enjoyed." Walls v. Midland Carbon 
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affirmative powers in enacting the filing requirements, in im-
posing the penalty of extinguishment set forth in§ 314(c), and 
in applying the requirements and sanction to claims located 
before FLPMA was passed. 
Second, we look to the substantive effect of§ 314(c) to de-
termine whether Congress is nonetheless barred from enact-
ing it as a result of the intrusion it works on some constitu-
tionally protected right. With respect to the regulation of 
private property, any such protection must come from the 
Fifth Amendment's proscription against the taking of private 
property without just compensation. On this point, how-
ever, Texaco is controlling: "this Court has never required 
[Congress] to compensate the owner for the consequences of 
his own neglect." 454 U. S., at 530. Appellees failed to 
inform themselves of the proper filing deadline and failed to 
file in timely fashion the documents required by federal law. 
Their property loss was one appellees could have avoided 
with minimal burden; it was their failure to file-apd not the 
action of Congress-that caused the property right to be 
extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not "take" 
private property when an individual's reasonable, invest-
Co., 254 U. S. 300, 315 (1920). The limitations on the legislature's power 
to act for the public welfare by conditioning continued retention of prop-
erty on the performance of newly imposed duties are essentially twofold: 
first , the burden imposed by the regulation cannot be so unreasonable that 
it "force[s] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, must be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); second, the individual must have 
notice of the newly-imposed requirements of the law and a "reasonable 
opportunity" to conform his conduct to those requirements. North Lara-
mie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1924). In this case, Con-
gress has chosen to redefine the way in which a mining claim can be lost 
through imposition of a filing requirement that serves valid public objec-
tives, imposes the most minimal of burdens on property holders, and takes 
effect only after appellees have had sufficient notice of their need to comply 
and a reasonable opportunity to do so. That the filing requirement meets 
these standards is sufficient, under Texaco, to make it a reasonable restric-
tion on the continued retention of the property right. 
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ment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long 
as he complies with the regulatory restrictions the legislature 
has imposed. See, e. g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 
279-280; Terry v. Anderson, supra, 95 U. S., at 632-633; cf. 
Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457. 466 ("What right has 
any one to complain, when a reasonable time has been given 
him, if he has not been vigilant in asserting his rights?"). 
Third, the Act provides appellees with all the process that 
is their constitutional due. In altering substantive rights 
through the enactment of rules of general applicability, a leg-
islature generally provides constitutionally adequate process 
simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the ex-
tent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those 
within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to 
familiarize themselves with the general requirements im-
posed and to comply with those requirements. Texaco, 454 
U. S., at 532; see also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 
321 U. S. 233, 243 (1944); North Laramie Land Co. v. Horr-
man, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). Here there can be no doubt 
that the Act's recording provisions meet these minimal re-
quirements. Although FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners 
of existing claims, such as appellees, were not required to 
make an initial recording until October 1979. This three-
year period, during which individuals could become familiar 
with the requirements of the new law, surpasses the two-
year grace period we upheld in the context of a similar regu-
lation of mineral interests in Texaco. Moreover, the specific 
annual filing obligation at issue in this case is not triggered 
until the year after which the claim is recorded initially; thus, 
every claimant in appellees' position already has filed once 
before the annual filing obligations come due, and the very 
fact that these claimants already have made one filing under 
the Act indicates that they know, or must be presumed to 
know, of the existence of the Act and of their need to inquire 
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into its demands. 13 The requirement of an annual filing thus 
was not so unlikely to come to the attention of those in the 
position of appellees as to render unconstitutional the notice 
provided by the three-year grace period. 14 
Despite the fact that FLPMA meets the three standards 
laid down in Texaco for the imposition of new regulatory 
restraints on existing property rights, the District Court 
seemed to believe that individualized notice of the filing dead-
lines was nonetheless constitutionally required. The Dis-
trict Court felt that such a requirement would not be "overly 
burdensome" to the Government and would be of great bene-
fit to mining claimants. The District Court may well be 
right that such an individualized notice scheme would be a 
sound means of administering the Act. 15 But in the regula-
tion of private property rights, the Constitution offers the 
courts no warrant to inquire into whether some other scheme 
might be more rational or desirable than the one chosen by 
Congress; as long as the legislative scheme is a rational way 
of reaching Congress' objectives, the efficacy of alternative 
routes is for Congress alone to consider. "It is enough to say 
that the Act approaches the problem of [developing a national 
13 As a result, this is not a case in which individual notice of a statutory 
change must be given because a statute is "sufficiently unusual in charac-
ter, and triggered in circumstances so commonplace, that an average citi-
zen would have no reason to regard the triggering event as calling for a 
heightened awareness of one's legal obligations." Texaco, 454 U. S., at 
547 (BRENNAN, J. , dissenting). 
14 BLM does provide for notice and a hearing on the adjudicative fact of 
whether the required filings were actually made, and appellees availed 
themselves of this process by appealing, to the Department of Interior 
Board of Land Appeals, the BLM order that extinguished their claims for 
failure to make a timely filing. 
10 In the exercise of its administrative discretion, BLM for the last sev-
eral years has chosen to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several 
months before the end of the year; according to the Government, these 
notices state that "you must file on or before 12130 [of the relevant year.] 
Failure to file timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim 
abandoned." Brief for Appellants 31-32, n. 22. 
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recording system] rationally; whether a [different notice 
scheme] would have been wiser or more practical under the 
circumstances is not a question of constitutional dimension." 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U. S. 1, 19 (1975). 
Because we deal here with purely economic legislation, Con-
gress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable to place 
a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to make the 
national recording system work. See Ibid; Weinberger v. l 
Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publica-
tions Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). The District Court 
therefore erred in invoking the Constitution to supplant the 
valid administrative scheme established by Congress. For 
that reason, the judgment below is_!_everse9J and the case re-
manded for further proceedings coliSiSteritWith this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Dan DATE: March 13, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-1394 United States v. Locke 
I like your draft dissent of March 12. 




1. As I requested JPS to write the dissent, 
could I fairly say at the outset that I agree with much of 
his dissent? I write separately because I think a 
stronger reason for disagreeing with the government's 
position is that it is fundamentally unfair in fact and 
also in a constitutional sense. 
2. Although the opinion of the other Justices 
state the facts and identify the forfeiture, I think it is 
important at the outset of our dissent to restate briefly 
the setting of this case. As now written, the dissent is 
impersonal, and cannot be easily understood in the absence 
of the factual s i taut ion. Perhaps a brief summary could 
be included in the text, with the more essential details 
placed in footnotes. 
2. 
Here we have a claimant who has worked his 
mining claim successfully for years. In no sense is it a 
"stale claim". Your draft does state that the claim 
holders had filed the basic information prior to October 
21, 197 6, but the seriousness of the forfeiture is not 
clear. 
3. Perhaps also, to make our dissent "free-
standing", it would be helpful to add footnotes wherever 
they may enlighten a reader who has not read any opinion 
other than ours. This would require, perhaps, a little 
fuller exposition in footnotes of the government's policy 
that for many years encouraged mining claim holders to do 
exactly what the Lockes did in this case: develop 
property values that lay dormant and unused. 
4. Use in the draft of the term "retroactively" 
may not be self evident unless one reads the other 
opinions. A note could explain this. 
5. We also should make clear in a note that 
ordinarily parties are bound to the precise date specified 
in a statute of limitations or the imposition of other 
duties or the filing of other claims. This case is 
unique, however for the reasons summarized by Justice 
•. 
3. 
Stevens' opinion (your page 3), plus the other reasons set 
forth in your draft. 
On page 3, summarizing JPS's list of 
circumstances, you refer to regulations that the "BLM 
itself considered the statutory deadline confusing". 
-erhaps a citation to the regulation would be appropriate. 
when was the pamphlet issued that 
reinterpreted the filing date to be "on or before December 
31"? 
Some of these suggestions, Dan, may be 
unnecessary in light of what others have written. I do 
not have their opinions before me. My basic thought is 
that other Justices may be more inclined to join us if our 
opinion could be read separately with a firmer 
understanding of what the government has done to the Locke 
family in this case for no good purpose, and in a state of 
confusion that the government itself recognizes. Due 
process requires notice that is clear as well as an 
opportunity to be heard. It is not easy to believe that, 
in all of the circumstances, the notice of this forfeiture 
of a property interest met the standard of clearness. I 
am glad you suggested the desirability of a separable 
-' 
4. 
dissent. In view of what the doctors have in mind for me 
beginning perhaps Thursday, I suggest that you make such 
changes along the lines of my suggestions as you think 
appropriate. Then have our dissent printed and circulated 
as a first draft. Of course, have a co-clerk read it both 
for substance and cite checking. 
The case will not be coming down next week -
indeed if all the votes should be in, ask that it be 
carried over for another week so that I can see the final 
form. But I would like to move our dissent along by 
getting it circulated. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 03/13/85 LOCKED SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Dan DATE: March 13, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-1394 United States v. Locke 
1 like your draft dissent of March 12. 




1. As 1 requested JPS to write the dissent, 
could 1 fairly say at the outset that 1 agree with much of 
his dissent? 1 write separately because 1 think a 
stronger reason for disagreeing with the government's 
position is that it is fundamentally unfair in fact and 
also in a constitutional sense. 
2. Although the opinion of the other Justices 
state the facts and identify the forfeiture, 1 think it is 
important at the outset of our dissent to restate briefly 
the setting of this case. As now written, the dissent is 
impersonal, and cannot be easily understood in the absence 
of the factual sitaution. Perhaps a brief summary could 
be included in the text, with the more essential details 
placed in footnotes. 
'• 
2. 
Here we have a claimant who has worked his 
mining claim successfully for years. In no sense is it a 
"stale claim". Your draft does state that the claim 
holders had filed the basic information prior to October 
21, 197 6, but the seriousness of the forfeiture is not 
clear. 
3. Perhaps also, to make our dissent "free-
standing", it would be helpful to add footnotes wherever 
they may enlighten a reader who has not read any opinion 
other than ours. This would require, perhaps, a little 
fuller exposition in footnotes of the government's policy 
that for many years encouraged mining claim holders to do 
exactly what the Lockes did in this case: develop 
property values that lay dormant and unused. 
4. Use in the draft of the term "retroactively" 
may not be self evident unless one reads the other 
opinions. A note could explain this. 
5. We also should make clear in a note that 
ordinarily parties are bound to the precise date specified 
in a statute of limitations or 
duties or the filing of other 
unique, however for the reasons 
the imposition of other 
claims. This case is 
summarized by Justice 
'. 
3. 
Stevens' opinion (your page 3), plus the other reasons set 
forth in your draft. 
On page 3, summarizing JPS's list of 
circumstances, you refer to regulations that the "BLM 
itself considered the statutory deadline confusing". 
Perhaps a citation to the regulation would be appropriate. 
And when was the pamphlet issued that 
reinterpreted the filing date to be "on or before December 
31"? 
* * * 
Some of these suggestions, Dan, may be 
unnecessary in light of what others have written. I do 
not have their opinions before me. My basic thought is 
that other Justices may be more inclined to join us if our 
opinion could be read separately with a firmer 
understanding of what the government has done to the Locke 
family in this case for no good purpose, and in a state of 
confusion that the government itself recognizes. Due 
process requires notice that is clear as well as an 
opportunity to be heard. It is not easy to believe that, 
in all of the circumstances, the notice of this forfeiture 
of a property interest met the standard of clearness. I 
am glad you suggested the desirability of a separable 
4. 
dissent. In view of what the doctors have in mind for me 
beginning perhaps Thursday, I suggest that you make such 
changes along the lines of my suggestions as you think 
appropriate. Then have our dissent printed and circulated 
as a first draft. Of course, have a co-clerk read it both 
for substance and cite checking. 
The case will not be coming down next week -
indeed if all the votes should be in, ask that it be 
carried over for another week so that I can see the final 
form. But I would like to move our dissent along by 





5£-L4 -- _;? r ~ -4z;;j} GL_ ~ 




To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
Re: United States v. Locke, No. 83-1394. 
I have drafted a dissent in this case for you to consid-
er. At this point, I have focused on the deadline rather than on 
the irrebuttable presumption/abandonment issue. I have done this 
for two reasons. First, as JUSTICE REHNQUIST notes in his con-
.,.! 
currence, JUSTICE MARSHALL has viewed the case in such a way that ~ 
he ignores the second issue. If your dissent should become a 
majority, plurality, or concurring opinion, it would probably be 
necessary to discuss this issue, but you do not need to discuss 
it now in order to respond to all of JUSTICE MARSHALL'S argu-
ments. Second, I thought that you would probably stand a better 
chance of having someone join you if at this point you wrote an 
opinion addressing no more issues than are absolutely necessary. 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that the Government can 
impose a forfeiture for a mining claimholder 's failure 
strictly to observe retroactively imposed recording 
requirements that are so uncertain that not only a 
reasonable man might, but the agency itself did, mistake 
them. I believe that imposing a forfeiture under these 
conditions deprives the claimholder of property in 
violation of constitutional requirements. 
-~ 
Faced with the difficulty stale mining claims had 
created in determining property rights on public lands, 
Congress enacted §314 of the Federal Land 0 olicy and 
Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2769, 43 u.s.c. §1744. 
This provision required existing claimholders to record 
their claims in order to retain them. The recordation 
.,. 
2. 
requirement at issue stated that "within the three-year 
period following October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31 
of each year thereafter," id. §1744 (a) , claimholders had 
to file with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of 
a notice of intention to retain the claim, an affidavit of 
assessment work, or a special form, id. §1744(1) and (2). 
Failure to make either the initial or a subsequent yearly 
filing was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the mining claim n Id. §1744(c). 
There is no dispute that appellees complied fully with the 
initial recordation requirement. Rather, the dispute 
arose after they filed their first annual notice on, 
rather than prior to, December 31. It is this one-day 
difference in good faith interpretation of the statutory 
deadline that gives rise to the present controversy. 
3. 
a_~~ 
JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to 1\ S€Vera.!l 
circumstances ~cast doubt both on the care with which 
Congress drafted §314 and on its meaning. Specifically, 
he notes that ( i) the section does not clearly describe 
what must be filed, let alone when it must be filed; (ii) 
BLM's rewording of the deadline in its implementing 
regulations indicates that the BLM itself considered the 
statutory· deadline confusing; (iii) lest there be any 
doubt that the BLM recognized this possible confusion, it 
itself described the section in a pamphlet distributed to 
miners as requiring filing "on or before December 31;" 
~a.-r 
( i v) BLM, wQ..ieh enforces the section, has interpreted it 
quite flexibly; and (v) irrationally requiring property 
holders to file by one day before the end of the year, 
rather than by the end of the year itself, creates "a trap 
4. 
for the unwary," post, at 7. As JUSTICE STEVENS states, 
these facts, particularly the last, suggest not only that 
Congress drafted §314 inartfully but also that Congress 
may actually have intended to require filing "on or 
before," not "prior to," December 31. This is certainly 
the more reasonable interpretation of congressional intent 
and is consistent with all the policies of the Act. 
I do not believe, however, that given the special 
circumstances of this case we need determine what Congress 
actually intended. As the Court today recognizes, the 
Takings Clause imposes some limitations on the 
Government's power to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 16-18. 
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 u.s. 516 (1982), we 
identified one of the most important of these limitations 
when we stated that "the State has the power to condition 
5. 
the permanent retention of [a) property right on the 
performance of reasonable conditions .. ld. ' at 526 
(emphasis added); accord Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 
290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where a [forfeiture) 
provision • • • may be so unreasonable as to amount to a 
denial of a right, and call for the interposition of the 
court.") • Furthermore, retroactively imposed conditions 
must meet due process standards, Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 u.s. 1, 16-17 (1976), which require, among 
other things, that an individual be able to determine what 
actions he must take to protect his existing interests, 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. Together these 
constitutional protections prevent the Government from 
depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily. 
6. 
In the present case there is no claim that a 
yearly filing requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, 
the claim arises from the fact that the language "prior to 
December 31" creates uncertainty about when an otherwise 
reasonable filing period ends. Given the natural tendency 
to interpret this phrase as "by the end of the calendar 
year," rather than "by the day before the end of the 
calendar year," I believe this uncertainty violated the 
high standard of certainty and definiteness that the 
Takings and Due Process Clauses together require. 
Certainly the statement in at least one of the 
Government's own publications that filing was required "on 
or before December 31," Department of the Interior, 
Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands 10 (1978), 
supports this conclusion. Terminating a property interest 
.~ 
7. 
because a property holder reasonably believed that under 
the statute he had an additional day to satisfy any filing 
requirements is no less arbitrary than terminating it for 
failure to satisfy these same conditions in an 
unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 
u.s. 55, 62 (1902): Terry v. Anderson, 95 u.s. 628, 632-
633 (1878). Although the latter may rest on 
impossibility, the former rests on good faith performance 
a day late of what could easily have been performed the 
day before. Neither serves a purpose other than forcing 
an arbitrary forfeiture of property rights to the State. 
I believe the Constitution requires that the law 
inform the property holder with more certainty and 
definiteness than did §314 when he must fulfill any 




least in 1980, nothing cured this statutory uncertainty. 
The regulations, as JUSTICE STEVENS notes, post, at 5 and 
6, evidenced rather than dispelled the confusion, and it 
was not until the following year that the BLM started 
sending individual reminders of the filing requirements to 
claimholders each September. Such notice, although not 
required, could have made the deadline sufficiently clear 
to have passed constitutional muster. 
For the reasons above, I ~ dissent. 
United States v. Locke, No. 83-1394. 
----
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS'S dissent. 
I write separately only because under the special 
circumstances of this case I do not believe it necessary 
to decide what Congress actually intended. Even if the 
Court is correct in believing that Congress intended to 
require filings on or before the next-to-the-last day of 
the year, rather than, more reasonably, by the end of the 
calendar year itself, the statutory deadline is too 
uncertain to satisfy constitutional requirements. It 
simply fails to give property holders clear and definite 





As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 1-2, the 
since the nineteenth century encouraged its 
citizens to discover and develop certain minerals on the 
public lands. Under the general mining laws, 30 u.s.c. 
§22 et seq., an individual who locates a mining claim has 
the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining 
purposes and may extract and sell minerals he finds there 
without paying a royalty to the federal government. Id. 
§26. After making a valuable mineral discovery, the 
claimant may hold the claim so long as he performs $100 
worth of assessment work each year. !d. §28. If he 
performs certain additional conditions, the claimant may 
patent the claim for a nominal sum and thereby obtain 
further rights over the land and minerals. See id. §29. 
·. 
3. 
Until recently, there were no federal recordation 
requirements. 
F y~ale mining claims had 
~.,1-t; 
created ~i~g property rights on public lands,.. 
~~ 
~ 
Congress enacted §314 of the Federal Land Policy and 
1 
Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2769, 43 u.s.c. §1744. 
1section 314(a), 43 u.s.c. §1744(a), states in its 
entirety: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
"(a) Filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer 
mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976, 
shall, within the three-year period following 
October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31 of 
each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this 
subsection. The owner of an unpatented lode or 
placer mining claim located after October 21, 
1976 shall, prior to December 31 of each year 
following the calendar year in which the said 
claim was located, file the instruments required 
by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. 
"(1) File for record in the office where 
the location notice or certificate is recorded 
either a notice of intention to hold the mining 
claim (including but not limited to such notices 
as are provided by law to be filed when there 
has been a suspension or deferment of annual 
assessment work), an affidavit of assessment 
Footnote continued on next page. 
'> 
4. 
This provision required existing claimholders to record 
their claims in order to retain them. More specifically, 
it required that "within the three-year period following 
October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31 of each year 
thereafter," id. §1744(a), claimholders file with the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a notice of 
intention to retain their claims, an aff ida vi t of 
assessment work, or a special form, id. §1744(a) (1) and 
(2). Failure to make either the initial or a subsequent 
yearly filing was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute 
work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed 
report provided by section 28-1 of title 30, 
relating thereto. 
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau 
designated by the Secretary a copy of the 
official record of the instrument filed or 
recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this 
subsection, including a description of the 
location of the mining claim sufficient to 
locate the claimed lands on the ground." 
5. 
an abandonment of the mining claim II Id. §1744(c). 
Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of ten 
unpatented mining claims on federal land in Nevada. They 
located these claims in 1952 and 1955 and have, since 
1960, earned their livelihood by producing gravel and 
other building materials from them. From 1960 to the 1 
present, they have produced approximately $4,000,000 worth 
of materials. During the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, ~ 
~~~~~~ 
they produced~ ~r $1,000,000 • ~h. In no sense were 
their claims stale. 
The Lockes fully complied with §314's initial 
recordation requirement by properly filing a notice of 
~.J~ 
location on October 19, 1979. In order to f t how to 
"'\ 
comply with the subsequent yearly recordation 
requirements, the Lockes sent their daughter, who worked 
6. 
in their business office, to the Ely, Nevada office of the 
~~ 
BLM. There inquired into how A they should ~ she 
~ 
Hi:i-n'g the assessment notice and was told, among other 
1\ 
things, that the documents should be filed at the Reno 
office "on or before December 31, 1980." Following this 
advice, the Lockes hand-delivered their documents at the 
~~--
Reno office on ~date. On April 4, 1981, they received 
1\ 
notice from the BLM that their mining claims were 
"abandoned and void," App. to Juris. Statement 22a, 
because they had filed on, rather than prior to, December 
It is this one-day difference in good faith 
2The notice from the BLM also stated that "[s] ubject to 
valid intervening rights of third parties or the United 
States void or abandoned claims or sites may be relocated 
and, based on the new location date, the appropriate 
instruments may be refiled within the time periods 
prescribed by the regulations." App. to Juris. Statement 
22a. Unlike most claimants, however, the Lockes were 
unable to relocate their claims because the Common 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
interpretation of the statutory deadline that gives rise 
to the present controversy. 
JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of 
circumstances that cast doubt both on the care with which 
Congress drafted §314 and on its meaning. Specifically, 
he notes that ( i) the section does not clearly describe 
what must be filed, let alone when it must be filed; (ii) 
BLM's rewording of the deadline in its implementing 
regulations, 43 C.F.R. §3833.2-l(a) (1), indicates that the 
BLM itself considered the statutory deadline confusing; 
(iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM recognized this 
possible confusion, even it had described the section in a 
Varieties Act of 1955, 30 u.s.c. §611 et seg., had 
withdrawn deposits of common building materials from 
coverage of the general mining laws. To them, forfeiture 
meant not relocation and refiling, but rather irrevocable 
loss of their claims and R•Fm- to their livelihoods. 
(_ 
. ' 
... w '· 'r.-
8. 
pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requiring filing 
.. on or before December 31; .. (iv) 
ft.ai-
BLM, w~h enforces the 
section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and (v) 
irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day 
before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the 
year itself, creates .. a trap for the unwary, .. post, at 7. 
~c.J4 
As JUSTICE STEVENS states, these facts, particularly the 
1\ 
last, suggest not only that Congress drafted §314 
inartfully but also that Congress may actually have 
intended to require filing .. on or before, .. not .. prior to, .. 
December 31. This is certainly the more reasonable 
interpretation of congressional intent and is consistent 
with all the policies of the Act. 
I do not believe, however, that given the special 
circumstances of this case we need determine what Congress 
9. 
actually intended. As the Court today recognizes, the 
Takings Clause imposes some limitations on the 
Government's power to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 16-18. 
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 u.s. 516 (1982), we 
identified one of the most important of these limitations 
when we stated that "the State has the power to condition 
the permanent retention of [a] property right on the 
performance of reasonable conditions " Id. , at 526 
(emphasis added); accord Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 
290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where a [forfeiture] 
provisio [n] ..• may be so unreasonable as to amount to a 
denial of a right, and call for the interposition of the 
court ..•. "). Furthermore, conditions, like those here, 
imposed after a property interest is created must also 
meet due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
.. 
10. 
Mining Co., 428 u.s. 1, 16-17 These standards 
require, among other things, that 
must take to protect his 
interests. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. 
Together the Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the 
Government from depriving an individual of property rights 
arbitrarily. 
In the present case there is no claim that a 
yearly filing requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, 
the claim arises from the fact that the language "prior to 
aA- -kJ 
December 31" creates uncertainty a.bo.Y-t~ when an otherwise 
reasonable filing period ends. Given the natural tendency 
to interpret this phrase as "by the end of the calendar 
year," rather than "on or before the next-to-the-last day 
of the calendar year," I believe this uncertainty violated 
11. 
the ~standard of certainty and definiteness that the 
Constitution requires. statement in at 
least one of the Government's own publications that filing 
was required ~on or before December 31,~ Department of the 
Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands lO 
(1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a property 
interest because a property holder reasonably believed 
that under the statute he had an additional day to satisfy 
any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than 
terminating it for failure to satisfy these same 
conditions in an unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson 
v. Iseminger, 185 u.s. 55, 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 
95 u.s. 628, 632-633 (1878). Although the latter may rest 
on impossibility, the former rests on good faith 
performance a day late of what {Co~lj easily ~have been 
.. 
12. 
t:n'- 'J'b P:DJ P~, z .. ; ll.';4~f 
performed the day before. Neither serves a purpos~ther 
than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of property rights to 
the State. 
I believe the Constitution requires that the law 
inform the property holder with more certainty and 
I 
definiteness than did §314 when he must fulfill any 
recording requirements imposed after a property interest 
is created. Given the statutory uncertainty here, I would 
find a forfeiture imposed for filing on December 31 to be 
. l'd 3 1nva 1 . 
3
Parties ordinarily bound to the consequences of 
their fa ing strictly to meet statutory deadlines. 
Because f the special circumstances JUSTICE STEVENS 
identifie , ~ and bee~ee e£ the constitutional 
concerns 1:- -Gi~cass, this case is unique. Mo 
eadlines involve none of the particular concerns JUS ~E 
TEVENS mentions and even many deadlines re ring 
/- erformance of some condition "prior to December " would 
ot implicate both the Takings and Due Proce lauses. 
-......a-#*c 
13. 
I accordingly dissent. 
03/20 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1394 
UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MADISON 
D. LOCKE ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DIS-
TRICT OF NEVADA 
[March -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS's dissent. I write 
separately only because under the special circumstances of 
this case I do not believe it necessary to decide what Con-
gress actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in 
believing that Congress intended to require filings on or 
before the next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more 
reasonably, by the end of the calendar year itself, the statu-
tory deadline is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional 
requirements. It simply fails to give property holders clear 
and definite notice of what they must do to protect their 
existing property interests. 
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 1-2, the Government 
since the nineteenth century has encouraged its citizens to 
discover and develop certain minerals on the public lands. 
Under the general mining laws, 30 U.S. C. §22 et seq., an 
individual who locates a mining claim has the right of ex-
clusive possession of the land for mining purposes and may 
extract and sell minerals he finds there without paying a 
royalty to the federal government. I d. § 26. Mter making 
a valuable mineral discovery, the claimant may hold the claim 
so long as he performs $100 worth of assessment work each 
year. I d. § 28. If he performs certain additional conditions, 
the claimant may patent the claim for a nominal sum and 
thereby obtain further rights over the land and minerals. 
83-1394-DISSENT 
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See id. § 29. Until recently, there were no federal record-
ation requirements. 
Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created 
as to property rights on public lands, Congress enacted § 314 
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90 
Stat. 2769, 43 U.S. C. § 1744. 1 This provision required 
existing claimholders to record their claims in order to retain 
them. More specifically, it required that "within the three-
year period following October 21, 1976 and prior to December 
31 of each year thereafter," id. § 1744(a), claimholders file 
with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a no-
tice of intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assess-
ment work, or a special form, id. § 1744(a)(1) and (2). Fail-
ure to make either the initial or a subsequent yearly filing 
was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment 
of the mining claim .... " I d. § 17 44( c). 
Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of ten unpatented min-
ing claims on federal land in Nevada. They located these 
1 Section 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), states in its entirety: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
"(a) Filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an 
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21, 1976 shall, 
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the 
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this subsection. 
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of 
assessment work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed report provided by 
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto. 
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy 
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
83-1394-DISSENT 
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claims in 1952 and 1955 and have, since 1960, earned their 
livelihood by producing gravel and other building materials 
from them. From 1960 to the present, they have produced 
approximately $4,000,000 worth of materials. During the 
1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and 
other materials worth more than $1,000,000. In no sense 
were their claims stale. 
The Lockes fully complied with § 314's initial recordation 
requirement by properly filing a notice of location on October 
19, 1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the sub-
sequent yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent 
their daughter, who worked in their business office, to the 
Ely, Nevada office of the BLM. There she inquired into how 
and when they should file the assessment notice and was told, 
among other things, that the documents should be filed at the 
Reno office "on or before December 31, 1980." Locke v. 
United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (Nev. 1983). Following 
this advice, the Lockes hand-delivered their documents at 
the Reno office on that date. On April4, 1981, they received 
notice from the BLM that their mining claims were "aban-
doned and void," App. to Juris. Statement 22a, because they 
had filed on, rather than prior to, December 31. 2 It is this 
one-day difference in good faith interpretation of the statu-
tory deadline that gives rise to the present controversy. 
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground." 
2 The notice from the BLM also stated that "[s]ubject to valid interven-
ing rights of third parties or the United States void or abandoned claims or 
sites may be relocated and, based on the new location date, the appropriate 
instruments may be refiled within the time periods prescribed by the regu-
lations." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. Unlike most claimants, however, 
the Lockes were unable to relocate their claims because the Common V ari-
eties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611 et seq., had withdrawn deposits of com-
mon building materials from coverage of the general mining laws. To 
them, forfeiture meant not relocation and refiling, but rather irrevocable 
loss of their claims-the source of their livelihoods. 
83-1394-DISSENT 
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JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of circum-
stances that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress 
drafted § 314 and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that 
(i) the section does not clearly describe what must be filed, let 
alone when it must be filed; (ii) BLM's rewording of the dead-
line in its implementing regulations, 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a)(1), 
indicates that the BLM itself considered the statutory dead-
line confusing; (iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM 
recognized this possible confusion, even it had described the 
section in a pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requir-
ing filing "on or before December 31 ;" (iv) BLM, charged with 
enforcing the section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and 
(v) irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day 
before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the year 
itself, creates "a trap for the unwary," post, at 7. As 
JUSTICE STEVENS correctly states, these facts, particularly 
the last, suggest not only that Congress drafted § 314 
inartfully but also that Congress may actually have intended 
to require filing "on or before," not "prior to," December 31. 
This is certainly the more reasonable interpretation of con-
gressional intent and is consistent with all the policies of the 
Act. 
I do not believe, however, that given the special circum-
stances of this case we need determine what Congress actu-
ally intended. As the Court today recognizes, the Takings 
Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power 
to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 16-18. In Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), we identified one of the most 
important of these limitations when we stated that "the State 
has the power to condition the permanent retention of [a] 
property right on the performance of reasonable conditions 
. ... " ld., at 526 (emphasis added); accord Jackson v. 
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where a 
[forfeiture] provisio[n] . . . may be so unreasonable as to 
amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of 
the court ... "). Furthermore, conditions, like those here, 
83-1394-DISSENT 
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imposed after a property interest is created must also meet 
due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976). These standards require, 
among other things, that there be no question as to what 
actions an individual must take to protect his interests. 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. Together the 
Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the Government 
from depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily. 
In the present case there is no claim that a yearly filing 
requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim arises 
from the fact that the language "prior to December 31" cre-
ates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing 
period ends. Given the natural tendency to interpret this 
phrase as "by the end of the calendar year," rather than "on 
or before the next-to-the-last day of the calendar year," I 
believe this uncertainty violated the standard of certainty 
and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The state-
ment in at least one of the Government's own publications 
that filing was required "on or before December 31," Depart-
ment of the Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal 
Lands 10 (1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a 
property interest because a property holder reasonably be-
lieved that under the statute he had an additional day to sat-
isfy any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than termi-
nating it for failure to satisfy these same conditions in an 
unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 
U. S. 55, 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632-633 
(1878). Although the latter may rest on impossibility, the 
former rests on good faith performance a day late of what 
easily could have been performed the day before. Neither 
serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of 
property rights to the State. 
I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the 
property holder with more certainty and definiteness than 
did § 314 when he must fulfill any recording requirements 
imposed after a property interest is created. Given the stat-
83-1394-DISSENT 
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utory uncertainty here, I would find a forfeiture imposed for 
filing on December 31 to be invalid. 3 
I accordingly dissent. 
3 Parties ordinarily are bound to the consequences of their failing 
strictly to meet statutory deadlines. This is true, for example, as to stat-
utes of limitations and other filing deadlines clearly specified. Because of 
the special circumstances JUSTICE STEVENS identifies and the constitu-
tional concerns identified above, this case is unique. 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The primary question presented by this appeal is whether 
the Constitution prevents Congress from providing that hold-
ers of unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with the 
annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744, shall 
forfeit their claims. 
I 
From the enactment of the general mining laws in the nine-
teenth century until1976, those who sought to make their liv-
ing by locating and developing minerals on federal lands were 
virtually unconstrained by the fetters of federal control. 
The general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. § 22 et seq., still in 
effect today, allow United States citizens to go onto unappro-
priated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop 
certain minerals. "Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed 
by the minimal procedures required to fonnally "locate" the 
deposit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession 
of the land for mining purposes, 30 U. S. C. § 26; as long as 
$100 of assessment work is perfonned annually, the individ-
ual may continue to extract and sell minerals from the claim 
without paying any royalty to the United States, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 28. For a nominal sum, and after certain statutory con-
+ 
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thereby purchasing from the federal government the land 
and minerals and obtaining ultimate title to them. Patent-
ing, however, is not required, and an unpatented mining 
claim remains a fully recognized possessory interest. Best v. 
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335 (1963). 
By the 1960s, it had become clear that this nineteenth cen-
tury laissez faire regime had created virtual chaos with re-
spect to the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that 
more than six million unpatented mining claims existed on 
public lands other than the national forests; in addition, more 
than half the land in the National Forest System was thought 
to be covered by such claims. S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 
(1975). Many of these claims had been dormant for decades, 
and many were invalid for other reasons, but in the absence 
of a federal recording system, no simple way existed for 
determining which public lands were subject to mining loca-
tions, and whether those locations were valid or invalid. 
Ibid. As a result, federal land managers had to proceed 
slowly and cautiously in taking any action affecting federal 
land lest the federal property rights of claimants be unlaw-
fully disturbed. Each time the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) proposed a sale or other conveyance of federal land, a 
title search in the county recorder's office was necessary; if 
an outstanding mining claim was found, no matter how stale 
or apparently abandoned, formal administrative adjudication 
was required to determine the validity of the claim. 1 
After more than a decade of studying this problem in the 
context of a broader inquiry into the proper management of 
the public lands in the modern era, Congress in 1976 enacted 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 
94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U. S. C. §§ 1701-1784). 
Section 314 of the Act establishes a federal recording system 
that is designed both to rid federal lands of stale mining 
claims and to provide federal land managers with up-to-date 
1 See generally Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of 
Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219. 
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information that allows them to make informed land manage- t-o""""'"~ tQ./1 
ment decisions. 2 For claims located before FLPMA's enact- 1 
ment, 3 the federal recording system imposes two require-
ments. First, the claims must initially be recorded with the 
BLM by filing, within three years of FLPMA's enactment, a 
copy of the official record of the notice or certificate of loca-
tion. 90 Stat. 2743, §314(b); 43 U.S. C.§ 1744(b). Second, 
every year after the initial recording, and "prior to December 
31,'' the claimant must file with state officials and with BLM l 
a notice of intention to hold the claim , an affidavit of assess-
ment work performed on the claim, or a detailed reporting I 
1 The text of 43 U. S. C. § 1744 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
(a) Filing requirements 
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection .... 
(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), and affidavit 
of assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by 
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto. 
(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of 
the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely filing 
The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b) 
of this subsection shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandon-
ment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not 
be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely 
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording 
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but 
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site .... " 
1 A somewhat different scheme applies to claims located after October 
21, 1976, the date the Act was passed. 
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fonn. 90 Stat. 27 43, § 314(a); 43 U. S. C. § 17 44(a). Section 
314(c) of the Act provides that failure to comply with either of 
these requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to consti-
tute an abandonment of the mining claim . . . by the owner." 
43 U. S. C. § 1744(c). 
The second of these requirements-the annual filing ob-
ligation-has created the dispute underlying this appeal. 
Appellees, four individuals "engaged in the business of 
operating mining properties in Nevada," 4 purchased in 1960 
and 1966 ten unpatented mining claims on public lands near 
Ely, Nevada. These claims were major sources of gravel 
and building material: the claims are valued at several million 
dollars, 5 and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, appel-
lees' gross income totalled more than one million dollars. 6 
Throughout the period during which they owned the claims, 
appellees complied with annual state law filing and assess-
ment work requirements. In addition, appellees satisfied 
FLPMA's initial recording requirement by properly filing 
with BLM a notice of location, thereby putting their claims 
on record for purposes of FLPMA. 
At the end of 1980, however, appellees failed to meet on 
time their first annual obligation to file with the federal gov-
ernment. After allegedly receiving misleading infonnation I 
from a BLM employee, 1 appellees waited until December 31 
• Plaintifr's Complaint '2. 
'Plaintifr's Complaint ' 15. 
• Lock~ v. United State3, 573 F . Supp. 472, 474 (1983). From 1960 to 
1980, total gross income from the claims exceeded four million dollars. 
Ibid. 
1 An affidavit submitted to the District Court by one of appellees' 
employees stated that BLM officials in Ely had told the employee that the 
filing could be made at the BLM Reno office "on or before December 31, 
1980." Affidavit of Laura C. Locke '3. The 1978 ver5ion of a BLM Ques-
tion and Answer pamphlet erroneously stated that the annual filings had to 
be made "on or before December 31" of each year. Staking a Claim on 
Federal Lands 9-10 (1978). Later ver5ions have corrected this error to 
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to submit to BLM the annual notice of intent to hold or proof 
of assessment work performed required under section 314(a) 
ofFLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a). As noted above, that sec-
tion requires these documents to be filed annually "prior to 
December 31." Had appellees checked, they further would 
have discovered that BLM regulations made quite clear that 
claimants were required to make the annual filings in the 
proper BLM office "on or before December 30 of each calen-
der year." 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a) (1980) (current version at 
43 CFR 3833.2-l(b)(l). Thus, appellees' filing was one day 
too late. 
This fact was brought painfully home to appellees when 
they received a letter from the BLM Nevada State Office in-
forming them that their claims had been declared abandoned 
and void due to their tardy filing. In many cases, loss of a 
claim in this way would have minimal practical effect; the 
claimant could simply locate the same claim again and then 
rerecord it with BLM. In this case, however, relocation of 
appellees' claims, which were initially located by appellees' 
predecessors in 1952 and 1954, was prohibited by the Com-
mon Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611; that Act pro-
bring the pamphlet into accord with the BLM regulations that require the 
filings to be made "on or before Deeember 30." 
JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE PoWELL seek to make much of this pam-
phlet and of the uncontroverted evidence that appellees were told a De-
cember 31 filing would comply with the statute. See post, at 6, 11, 12. 
However, at the time appellees filed in 1980, BLM regulations and the 
then-current pamphlets made clear that the filing was required "on or 
before Deeember 30." Thus, the dissenters' reliance on this pamphlet 
would seem better direeted to the claim that the United States was equita-
bly estopped from forfeiting appellees' claims, given the advice of the BLM 
agent and the objective basis the 1978 pamphlet provides for crediting the 
claim that such advice was given. The District Court did not consider this 
estoppel claim. Without expressing any view as to whether, as a matter 
of law, appellees could prevail on such a theory, see Heckler v. Community 
Health Services, Inc.,- U. S.- (1984), we leave any further treat-
ment of this issue, including fuller development of the reeord, to the Dis-
trict Court on remand. 
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spectively barred location of the sort of minerals yielded by 
appellees' claims. Appellees' mineral deposits thus es-
cheated to the Government. 
After losing an administrative appeal, appellees filed the 
present action in 'the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada. Their complaint alleged, inter alia, that 
§ 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property 
without just compensation and denied them due process. On 
summary judgment, the District Court held that § 314(c) did 
indeed deprive appellees of the process to which they were 
constitutionally due. The District Court reasoned that 
§ 314(c) created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption 
that claimants who failed to make a timely filing intended to 
abandon their claims. Rather than relying on this presump-
tion, the Government was obliged, in the District Court's 
view, to provide individualized notice to claimants that their 
claims were in danger of being lost, followed by a post-filing 
deadline hearing at which the claimants could demonstrate 
that they had not, in fact, abandoned a claim. Alternatively, 
the District Court held that the one-day late filing "substan-
tially complied" with the Act and regulations. 
Because a District Court had held an Act of Congress un-
constitutional in a civil sUit to which the United States was 
a party, we noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252. -- U. S. -- (1984). 8 We now reverse. 
• That the District Court decided the case on both constitutional and 
statutory grounds does not affect this Court's obligation under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252 to take jurisdiction over the case; as long as the unconstitutionality 
of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of decision below in a civil suit 
to which the United States is a party, appeal lies directly to this Court. 
Uni.Ud. States v. Rock Royal Cooprrative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 541 (1939). 
Another District Court in the West similarly has declared section 314(c) 
unconstitutional with respect to invalidation of claims based on failure to 
meet the initial recordation requirements of § 314(a) in timely fashion. 
Ragen v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (D Mont. 1982). 
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II 
Appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 brings before this Court 
not merely the constitutional question decided below, but the 
entire case. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31 
(1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 27 n. 7 (1960). 
The entire case includes nonconstitutional questions actually 
decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional 
grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court. 
United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27-28 (1979). 9 These 
principles are important aids in the prudential exercise of our 
appellate jurisdiction, for when a case arrives here by appeal 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, this Court will not pass on the con-
stitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the 
Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground 
fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be 
avoided. See Heckler v. Mathews, --U.S. --, --
(1984); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974); 
d. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
335 U. S. 106, 110 (1948) (appeals under former Criminal 
Appeals Act); see generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(1936). Thus, we turn first to the nonconstitutional ques-
tions pressed below. 
III 
A 
Before the District Court, appellees asserted that the sec-
tion 314(a) requirement of a filing ''prior to December 31 of 
each year" should be . construed to require a filing "on or 
• When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by the 
lower court, we may vacate the decision below and remand with instruc-
tions that those questions be decided, see Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 
231 (1976), or we may choose to decide those questions ourselves without 
benefit of lower court analysis, see United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23 
(1979). The choice between these options depends on the extent to which 
lower court factfi.nding and analysis of the nonconstitutional questions will 
be necessary or useful to our disposition of those questions. 
83-1394--0PINION 
8 UNITED STATES v. LOCKE 
before December 31." Thus, appellees argued, their Decem-
ber 31 filing had in fact complied with the statute, and the 
BLM had acted ultra vires in voiding their claims. 
Although the District Court did not address this argument, 
the argument raises a question sufficiently legal in nature 
that we choose to address it even in the absence of lower 
court analysis. See, e. g., United States v. Clark, supra. 
It is clear to us that the plain language of the statute simply 
cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on it. As even 
appellees conceded at oral argument, § 314(a) ''is a statement 
that Congress wanted it filed by December 30th. I think 
that is a clear statement ... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see also 
id., at 37 ("A literal reading of the statute would require a 
December 30th filing . . . . "). While we will not allow a 
literal reading of a statute to produce a result "demonstrably 
at odds with the intentions of its drafters," Griffin v. Oceanic 
ContractOTS, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982), with respect to 
filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress' words is gener-
ally the only proper reading of those words. To attempt to 
decide whether some date other than the one set out in the 
statute is the date actually ''intended" by Congress is to set 
sail on an aimless journey, for the purpose of a filing deadline 
would be just as well served by nearly any date a court might 
choose as by the date Congress has in fact set out in the stat-
ute. "Actual purpose is sometimes unlmown," U. S. Rail-
road Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 180 (STE-
VENS, J., concurring), and such is the case with filing 
deadlines; as might be expected, nothing in the legislative 
history suggests why Congress chose December 30 over 
December 31, or over September 1 (the end of the assess-
ment year for mining claims, 30 U. S. C. § 28), as the last day 
on which the required filings could be made. But "[d]ead-
lines are inherently arbitrary," while fixed dates "are often 
essential to accomplish necessary results." United States v. 
Boyle, - U. S. -, - (1984). Faced with the inher-
ent arbitrariness of filing deadlines, we must, at least in a 
' ', 
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civil case, apply by its terms the date fixed by the statute. 
Cf. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 
u.s. 166, 179 (1980). l0 
Moreover, BLM regulations have made absolutely clear 
since the enactment of FLPMA that "prior to December 31" 
means what it says. As the cUITent version of the filing 
regulations states: 
The owner of an unpatented mining claim located on 
Federal lands ... shall have filed or caused to have been 
filed on OT before December 30 of each calendar year . . . 
evidence of annual assessment work performed during 
the previous assessment year or a notice of intention to 
hold the mining claim. 43 CFR § 3833.2-1. 
See also 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1982) (same); 43 CFR 
3833.2-1(a) (1981) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1 (a) (1980) (same); 
43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1979) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a)(1) 
(1978) (''prior to" Dec. 31); 43 CFR 3833.2-l(a)(1) (1977) 
(''prior to" Dec. 31). Leading mining treatises similarly in-
form claimants that "[i]t is important to note that the filing of 
a notice of intention or evidence of assessment work must be 
done priar to December 31 of each year, i. e, on or before 
December 30." 2 American Law of Mining§ 7.23D, at 150.2 
(1983) (emphasis in original); see also 23 Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Institute 25 (1977) (same). If appellees, who 
were businessmen involved in the running of a major mining 
11 Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of 
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392-398 (1982). Whether this general principle 
applies to deadlines that run in favor of the Government is a question on 
which we express no opinion today. In addition, no showing has been 
made that appellees were in any way "unable to exercise the usual care and 
diligence" that would have allowed them to meet the filing deadline or to 
learn of its existence. See United States v. Boyle,- U.S.-, -
(BRENNAN, J. , concuning). Of course, at issue in Boyle was an explicit 
provision in the Internal Revenue Code that provided a reasonable cause 
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operation for more than 20 years, had any questions about 
whether a December 31 filing complied with the statute, it 
was incumbent upon them, as it is upon other businessmen, 
see United States v. Boyle, supra, to have checked the regu-
lations or to have consulted an attorney for legal advice. 
Pursuit of either of these courses, rather than the submission 
of a last-minute filing, would surely have led appellees to the 
conclusion that December 30 was the last day on which they 
could file safely. 
In so saying, we are not insensitive to the problems posed 
by congressional reliance on the words ''prior to December 
31." See post (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the fact that 
Congress might have acted with greater clarity or foresight 
does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft statutes in an 
effort to achieve that which Congress is perceived to have 
failed to do. "There is a basic difference between filling a 
gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Con-
gress has affirmatively and specifically enacted." Mobil Oil 
C<Yrp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978). Nor is 
the judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the clear import 
of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those 
words lead to a harsh result. See Northwest Airlines v. 
Transport Workers Union, 451 U. S. 77, 98 (1981). On the 
contrary, deference to the supremacy of the legislature, as 
well as recognition that congressmen typically vote on the 
language of a bill, generally require us to assume that "the 
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of 
the words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 
(1962). "Going behind the plain language of a statute in 
search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is 'a step to 
be taken cautiously' even under the best of circumstances." 
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 75 (1982) 
(quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 
26 (1977)). When even after taking this step nothing in the 
legislative history remotely suggests a congressional intent 
contrary to Congress' chosen words, and neither appellees 
•', 
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nor the dissenters have pointed to anything that so suggests, 
any further steps take the courts out of the realm of interpre-
tation and place them in the domain of legislation. The 
phrase "prior to" may be clumsy, but its meaning is clear. 11 
Under these circumstances, we are obligated to apply the 
"prior to December 31" language by its terms. See, e. g., 
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982); 
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 
447 u. s. 102, 108 (1980). 
The agency's regulations clarify and confirm the import of 
the statutory language by making clear that the annual 
filings must be made on or before December 30. These regu-
lations provide a conclusive answer to appellees' claim, for 
where the language of a filing deadline is plain and the agen-
cy's construction completely consistent with that language, 
the agency's construction simply cannot be found "sufficiently 
unreasonable" as to be unacceptable. FEC v. Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981). 
We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of dis- · 
ingenuous evasion" even to avoid a constitutional question. 
Moore Ice Cream v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1932) (Car-
dozo, J.). 12 We therefore hold that BLM did not act ultra 
vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely. 
u Legislative drafting books are filled with suggestions that the phrase l 
"prior to" be replaced with the word "before," see, e. g., R. Dickerson, 
Materials on Legal Drafting 293 (1981), but we have seen no suggestion 
that "prior to" be replaced with "on or before" -a phrase with obviously 
different substantive content. 
~we note that the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions that 
require action "prior to" some date, including at least 15 provisions that 
contemplate action "prior to December 31." See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5); 12 l- !:' W\IS. ~ ••A 
U. S. C. § 1709; 12 U. S. C. § 1823(g); 12 U. S. C. § 1841(a) (5)(A); 22 
U. S. C. § 3784(c); 26 U. S. C. § 503 (d)(l); 33 U. S. C. § 1319(a) (5)(B); 
42 U.S. C. §415(a)(1)(c)(ii); 42 U.S. C. § 1692-17(b); 42 U. S. C. 
§ 5614(b)(5); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2); 42 U. S. C. § 7521(b)(2); 43 U. S. C. 
§ 1744(a); 50 U. S.C, App. § 41; 50 U. S. C., App. § 1741. Dozens of state I 
statutes and local ordinances undoubtedly incorporate similar "prior to De-
cember 31" deadlines. In addition, legislatures know how to make explicit 
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Section 314(c) states that failure to comply with the filing 
requirements of§§ 314(a) and 314(b) "shall be deemed conclu-
sively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim." 
We must next consider whether this provision expresses a 
congressional intent to extinguish all claims for which filings 
have not been made, or only those claims for which filings 
have not been made and for which the claimants have a spe-
cific intent to abandon the claim. The District Court 
adopted the latter interpretation, and on that basis concluded 
that § 314(c) created a constitutionally impermissible 
irrebuttable presumption of abandonment. The District 
Court reasoned that, once Congress had chosen to make loss 
of a claim turn on the specific intent of the claimant, a prior 
hearing and findings on the claimant's intent were constitu-
tionally required before the claim of a non-filing claimant 
could be extinguished. 
In concluding that Congress was concerned with the spe-
cific intent of the claimant even when the claimant had failed 
to make the required filings, the District Court began from 
the fact that neither § 314(c) nor the Act itself defines the 
term "abandonment" as that term appears in § 314(c). The 
District Court then noted correctly that the common law of 
an intent to allow action on December 31 when they employ a Deeember 31 
date in a statute. See, e. g., 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(2); 22 U. S. C. § 3303; 43 
u. s. c. § 256. 
It is unclear whether the arguments advanced by the dissenters are 
meant to apply to all of these provisions, or only to some of them; if the 
latter, we are given little guidance as to how a court is to go about the 
rather ecleetic task of choosing which "prior to Deeember 31" deadlines it 
can interpret "'fiexibly." Understandably enough, the dissenters seek to 
disavow any intent to call all these "prior to December 31" deadlines into 
question and assure us that this is a ''unique case," post, at 6 n. 3 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting), involving a "unique factual matrix," post, at 11 (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting). The only thing we can find unique about this particular 
Deeember 31 deadline is that the dissenters are willing to go through such 
tortured reasoning to evade it. 
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mining traditionally has drawn a distinction between "aban-
donment" of a claim, which occurs only upon a showing of the 
claimant's intent to relinquish the claim, and "forfeiture" of a 
claim, for which only noncompliance with the requirements of 
law must be shown. See, e. g., 2 American Law of Mining 
§ 8.2, at 195-196 (1983) (relied upon by the District Court). 
Given that Congress had not expressly stated in the statute 
any intent to depart from the term-of-art meaning of "aban-
donment" at common law, the District Court concluded that 
§ 314(c) was intended to incorporate the traditional common-
law distinction between abandonment and forfeiture. Thus, 
reasoned the District Court, Congress did not intend to cause 
a forfeiture of claims for which the required filings had not 
been made, but rather to focus on the claimant's actual in-
tent. As a corollary, the District Court understood the fail-
ure to file to have been intended to be merely one piece of 
evidence in a factual inquiry into whether a claimant had a 
specific intent to abandon his property. 
This construction of the statutory scheme cannot withstand 
analysis. While reference to common-law conceptions is 
often a helpful guide to interpreting open-ended or undefined 
statutory terms, see, e. g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 
U. S. 322, 329 (1981); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 
U. S. 1, 59 (1910), this principle is a guide to legislative in-
tent, not a talisman of it, and the principle is not to be applied 
in defiance of a statute's overriding purposes and logic. Al-
though § 314(c) is couched in terms of a conclusive presump-
tion of "abandonment," there can be little doubt that Con-
gress intended § 314(c) to cause a forfeiture of all claims for 
which the filing requirements of §§ 314(a) and 314(b) had not 
been met. 
To begin with, the Senate version of § 314(c) provided that 
any claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to be abandoned and shall be void." S. 507, 94th 
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Cong., 1st Sess., -- Cong. Rec. S2371 (Feb. 25, 1976). 13 
The Committee Report accompanying S. 507 repeatedly indi-
cated that failure to comply with the filing requirements 
would make a claim "void." See S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65, 
66 (1975). The House legislation and reports merely repeat 
the statutory language without offering any explanation of it, 
but it is clear from the Conference Committee Report that 
the undisputed intent of the Senate-to make "void" those 
claims for which proper filings were not timely made-was 
the intent of both chambers. The Report stated: "Both the 
Senate bill and House amendments provided for recordation 
of mining claims and for extinguishment of abandonded 
claims." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 62 
(1976) (emphasis added). 
In addition, the District Court's construction fails to give 
effect to the "deemed conclusively'' language of § 314(c). If 
the failure to file merely shifts the burden to the claimant to 
prove that he intends to keep the claim, nothing "conclusive" 
is achieved by § 314(c). The District Court sought to avoid 
this conclusion by holding that § 314(c) does extinguish auto-
matically those claims for which initial recordings, as 
opposed to annual filings, have not been made; the District 
Court attempted to justify its distinction between initial 
recordings and annual filings on the ground that the domi-
nant purpose of § 314(c) was to avoid forcing BLM to the 
"awesome task of searching every local title record" to estab-
lish initially a federal recording system. 573 F. Supp. 472, 
477, (D. Nev. 1983). Once this purpose had been satisfied by 
an initial recording, the primary purposes of the conclusive 
presumption, in the District Court's view, had been met. 
But the clear language of§ 314(c) admits of no distinction be-
12 The Senate bill required only initial recordings, not annual filings, but 
this factor is not significant in light of the actions of the Conference Com-
mittee; the clear structure of the Senate bill was to impose the sanction of 
claim extinguishment on those who failed to make whatever filings federal 
law required. 
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tween initial recordings and annual filings: failure to do either 
"shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment." 
And the District Court's analysis of the purposes of§ 314(c) is 
also misguided, for the annual filing requirements serve a 
purpose similar to that of the initial recording requirement; 
millions of claims undoubtedly have now been recorded, and 
the presence of an annual filing obligation allows BLM to 
keep the system established in § 314 up to date on a yearly 
basis. To put the burden on BLM to keep this system cur-
rent through its own inquiry into the status of recorded 
claims would lead to a situation similar to that which led Con-
gress initially to make the federal recording . system self-
executing. The purposes of a self-executing recording sys-
tem are implicated similarly, if somewhat less substantially, 
by the annual filing obligation as by the initial recording 
requirement, and the District Court was not empowered to 
thwart these purposes or the clear language of § 314(c) by 
concluding that § 314(c) was actually concerned with only ini-
tial recordings. 
For these reasons, we find that Congress intended in 
§ 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which timely filings 
were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is 
simply made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time, 
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. See Western Min-
ing Council v. Watt, 643 F. 2d 619, 628 (CA9 1981). 
c 
A final statutory question must be resolved before we turn 
to the constitutional holding of the District Court. Relying 
primarily on Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., 400 U. S. 48 (1970), the 
District Court held that, even if the statute required a filing 
on or before December 30, appellees had "substantially com-
plied" by filing on December 31. We cannot accept this view 
of the statute. 
The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by 
filing sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the 
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least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting 
principle. If one-day late filings are acceptable, ten-day late 
filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of 
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing 
deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some 
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it. Filing 
deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate 
harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall 
just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing 
deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be en-
forced. "Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a 
lax attitude toward filing dates," United States v. Boyle, 
- U. S. -, - (1984). A filing deadline cannot be 
complied with, substantially or otherwise, by filing late--
even by one day. 
Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., supra, does not support a contrary 
conclusion. Hickel suggested, although it did not hold, that 
failure to meet the annual assessment work requirements of 
the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. § 28, which require that 
''not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or 
improvements made during each year," would not render a 
claim automatically void. Instead, if an individual complied 
substantially but not fully with the requirement, he might 
under some circumstances be able to retain possession of his 
claim. 
These suggestions in Hickel do not afford a safe haven to 
mine owners who fail to meet their filing obligations under 
any federal mining law. Failure to comply fully with the 
physical requirement that a certain amount of work be per-
formed each year is significantly different from the complete 
failure to file on time documents that federal law commands 
be filed. In addition, the general mining laws at issue in 
Hickel do not clearly provide that a claim will be lost for fail-
ure to meet the assessment work requirements. Thus, it 
was open to the Court to conclude in Hickel that Congress 
had intended to make the assessment work requirement 
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merely an indicia of a claimant's specific intent to retain a 
claim. Full compliance with the assessment work require-
ments would establish conclusively an intent to keep the 
claim, but less than full compliance would not by force of law 
operate to deprive the claimant of his claim. Instead, less 
than full compliance would subject the mine owner to a case-
by-ease determination of whether he nonetheless intended to 
keep his claim. See Hickel, supra, at 56-57. 
In this case, the statute explicitly provides that failure to 
comply with the applicable filing requirements leads auto-
matically to loss of the claim. See supra Part IIB. Thus, 
Congress has made it unnecessary to ascertain whether the 
individual in fact intends to abandon the claim, and there is 
no room to inquire whether substantial compliance is indica-
tive of the claimant's intent-intent is simply irrelevant if 
the required filings are not made. Hickel's discussion of 
substantial compliance is therefore inapposite to the statu-
tory scheme at issue here. As a result, Hickel gives miners 
no greater latitude with filing deadlines than have other 
individuals. 14 
1
• Since 1982, BLM regulations have provided that filings due on or 
before December 30 will be considered timely if postmarked on or before 
December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on the follow-
ing January 19th. 43 CFR 3833.0-S(m) (1983). Appellees and the dis-
senters attempt to transform this regulation into a blank check, generally 
authorizing "substantial compliance" with the filing requirements. We 
disagree for two reasons. First, the regulation was not in effect when 
appellees filed in 1980; it therefore cannot be relied on now to validate a 
purported "substantial compliance" in 1980. Second, that an agency has 
decided to take account of holiday mail delays by treating as timely filed a 
document postmarked on the statutory filing date does not require the 
agency to accept all documents hand delivered any time before January 
19th. Appellees' view would lead to an inftnite regression in which each 
time a mailing-receipt deadline was extended to make it congruent with the 
deadline for hand delivery, the hand-delivery deadline would have to be 
extended in turn to make it the same as the postmark deadline for mailed 
filings; if, as appears to be appellees' view, documents hand delivered on 
January 19th must be accepted, it is equally plausible to argue that docu-
' ' 
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IV 
Much of the District Court's constitutional discussion nec-
essarily falls with our conclusion that § 314(c) automatically 
deems forfeited those claims for which the required filings 
are not timely made. The District Court's invalidation of the 
statute rested heavily on the view that § 314(c) creates an 
''irrebuttable presumption that mining claims are abandoned 
if the miner fails to timely file" the required documents-that 
the statute presumes a failure to file to signify a specific 
intent to abandon the claim. But, as we have just held, 
§ 314(c) presumes nothing about a claimant's actual intent; 
the statute simply and conclusively deems such claims to be 
forfeited. As a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) is not subject to 
the individualized hearing requirement of such irrebuttable 
presumption cases as Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973) 
or Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 
(1974), for there is nothing to suggest that, in enacting 
§ 314(c), Congress was in any way concerned with whether a 
particular claimant's tardy filing or failure to file indicated an 
actual intent to abandon the claim. 
There are suggestions in the District Court's opinion that, 
even understood as a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) might be 
unconstitutional. We therefore go on to consider whether 
automatic forfeiture of a claim for failure to make annual 
filings is constitutionally permissible. The framework for 
ments postmarked on January 19th should al.5o be accepted. The agency 
rationally could decide that either of the options in this situation-requir-
ing mailings to be received by the same date that hand deliveries must be 
made or requiring mailings to be postmarked by that date-is a sound way 
of administering the statute. 
JUSTICE STEVENS further suggests that BLM would have been well 
within its authority to promulgate regulations const.rWng the statute to 
allow for December 31st filings. Assuming the correctness of this sugges-
tion, the fact that two interpretations of a statute are equally reasonable 
suggests to us that the agency's interpretation is sufficiently reasonable as 
to be acceptable. See FEC v. Democrru:tic Senatorial Campaign Com-
mittee, SUp1'Tl, 454 U. S., at 39. 
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analysis of this question, in both its substantive and proce-
dural dimensions, is set forth by our recent decision in 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982). There we up-
held a state statute pursuant to which a severed mineral in-
terest that had not been used for a period of 20 years auto-
matically lapsed and reverted to the current surface owner of 
the property, unless the mineral owner filed a statement of 
claim in the county recorder's office within two years of the 
statute's passage. 
A 
Under Texaco, we must first address the question of af-
firmative legislative power: whether Congress is authorized 
to "provide that property rights of this character shall be 
extinguished if their owners do not take the affinnative ac-
tion required by the" statute. Id., at 516. Even with re-
spect to vested property rights, a legislature generally has \ 
the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way 
in which those rights are used, or to condition their continued 
retention on perfonnance of certain affinnative duties. As 
long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restric-
tion designed to further legitimate legislative objectives, the 
legislature acts within its powers in imposing such new con-
straints or duties. See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty, 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 
90, 94 (1897); Vance v. Vance 108 U. S. 514, 517 (1883); Terry 
v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 (1877). "(L]egislation adjusting 
rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets 
otherwise settled expectations." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1976) (citations omitted). 
This power to qualify existing property rights is particu-
larly broad with respect to the "character" of the property 
rights at issue here. Although owners of unpatented min-
ing claims hold fully recognized possessory interests in their 
claims, see Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 
334, 335 (1963), we have recognized that these interests are a 
''unique fonn of property." I d., at 334. The United States, 
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as owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain, 
maintains broad powers over the terms · and conditions upon 
which the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired. 
See, e. g., Kleppe v. Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976). 
"A mining location which has not gone to patent is of no 
higher quality and no more immune from attack and in-
vestigation that are unpatented claims under the home-
stead and kindred laws. If valid, it gives to the claimant 
certain exclusive possessory rights, and so do homestead 
and desert claims. But no right arises from an invlaid 
claim of any kind. All must conform to the law under 
which they are initiated; otherwise they work an unlaw-
ful private appropriation and derogation of the rights of 
the public." Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 
460 (1920). 
Claimants thus must take their mineral interests with the 
knowledge that the Government retains substantial regula-
tory power over those interests. Cf. Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 413 
(1983). In addition, the property right here is · · 
. the right to a flow of in-
come from production of the claim. Similar vested economic 
rights are held subject to the Government's substantial 
power to regulate for the public good the conditions under 
which business is carried out and to redistribute the benefits 
and burdens of economic life. See, e. g., National R.R. Pas-
senger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., --
U.S. - (1985); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 
supra; see generally Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 
300, 315 (1920) (''in the interest of the community, [govern-
: ment may] limit one [right] that others may be enjoyed"). 
l'n.~ Against this background, there can be no doubt that Con-
"· gress could condition initial receipt of an unpatented mining 
claim upon an agreement to perform annual assessment work 
and make annual filings. That this requirement was applied 
to claims already located by the time FLPMA was enacted 
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and thus applies to vested claims does not alter the analysis, ' 
for any ''retroactive application of [FLPMA] is supported by 
a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means 
.... " PBSC v. R. A. Gray & Co.,- U. S. - (1984). 
The purposes of applying FLPMA's filing provisions to claims 
located before the Act was passed-to rid federal lands of 
stale mining claims and to provide for centralized collection 
by federal land managers of comprehensive and up-to-date in-
formation on the status of recorded but unpatented mining 
claims-are clearly legitimate. In addition, § 314(c) is a rea-
sonable, if severe, means of furthering these goals; sanction-
ing with loss of their claims those claimants who fail to file 
provides a powerful motivation to comply with the filing re-
quirements, while automatic invalidation for noncompliance 
enables federal land managers to know with certainty and 
ease whether a claim is currently valid. Finally, the restric-
tion attached to the continued retention of a mining claim im-
poses the most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must 
simply file a paper once a year indicating that the required 
assessment work has been performed or that they intend to 
hold the claim. 16 Indeed, appelles could have fully protected 
11 Appellees suggest that Texaco further requires that the restriction 
imposed be substantively reasonable in the sense that it adequately relate 
to some common law conception of the nature of the property right in-
volved. Thus, appellees point to the fact that, in Texaco, failure to file 
could produce a forfeiture only if, in addition, the mineral interest had lain 
dormant for 20 years; according to appellees, conjunction of a 20-year 
dormancy period with failure to file a statement of claim sufficiently indi-
cated abandonment, as that term is understood at common law, to justify 
the statute. 
Common-law principles do not, however, entitle an individual to retain 
his property until the common-law would recognize it as abandoned. Leg-
islatures can enact substantive rules of law that treat property as forfeited 
under conditions that the common-law would not consider sufficient to indi-
cate abandonment. See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 467 
("What is the evidence of an individual having abandoned his rights or 
property? It is clear that the subject is one over which every community 
is at liberty to make a rule for itself"). As long as proper notice of these 
·. 
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their interests against the effect of the statute by taking the 
minimal additional step of patenting the claims. As a result, 
Congress was well within its affirmative powers in enacting 
the filing requirements, in imposing the penalty of extin-
guishment set forth in § 314(c), and in applying the require-
ments and sanction to claims located before FLPMA was 
passed. 
B 
We look next to the substantive effect of§ 314(c) to deter-
mine whether Congress is nonetheless barred from enacting 
it because it works an impermissible intrusion on constitu-
tionally protected rights. With respect to the regulation of 
private property, any such protection must come from the 
Fifth Amendment's proscription against the taking of private 
property without just compensation. On this point, how-
ever, Texaco is controlling: ''this Court has never required 
[Congress] to compensate the owner for the consequences of 
his own neglect." 454 U. S., at 530. Appellees failed to 
inform themselves of the proper filing deadline and failed to 
file in timely fashion the documents required by federal law. 
Their property loss was one appellees could have avoided 
with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time-not 
the action of Congress-that caused the property right to be 
extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not "take" 
rules exists, and the burdens they impose are not so wholly disproportion-
ate to the burdens other individuals face in a highly regulated society that 
some people are being forced "alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, must be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong 
v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960), the burden imposed is a reason-
able restriction on the property right. Here Congress ha.s chosen to re-
define the way in which an unpatented mining claim can be lost through 
imposition of a filing requirement that serves valid public objectives, im-
poses the most minimal of burdens on property holders, and takes effect 
only after appellees have had sufficient notice of their need to comply and a 
reasonable opportunity to do so. That the filing requirement meets these 
standards is sufficient, under Tnaco, to make it a reasonable restriction on 
the continued retention of the property right. 
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private property when an individual's reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long 
as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions the \ 
legislature has imposed. See, e. g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 
U. S. 272, 279-280; Terry v. Anderson, supra, 95 U. S., at 
632-633; cf. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457. 466 
("What right has any one to complain, when a reasonable 
time has been given him, if he has not been vigilant in assert-
ing his rights?"). 
c 
Finally, the Act provides appellees with all the process 
that is their constitutional due. In altering substantive 
rights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a 
legislature generally provides constitutionally adequate proc-
ess simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the 
extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those 
within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to 
familiarize themselves with the general requirements im-
posed and to comply with those requirements. Texaco, 454 
U. S., at 532; see also Atkins v. Block,- U. S. -,- l 
(1985); Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 
243 (1944); North Laramie Land Co. v. Horrman, 268 U. S. 
276, 283 (1925). Here there can be no doubt that the Act's 
recording provisions meet these minimal requirements. Al-
though FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners of existing 
claims, such as appellees, were not required to make an ini-
tial recording until October 1979. This three-year period, 
during which individuals could become familiar with the 
requirements of the new law, surpasses the two-year grace 
period we upheld in the context of a similar regulation of min-
eral interests in Texaco. Moreover, the specific annual filing 
obligation at issue in this case is not triggered until the year 
after which the claim is recorded initially; thus, every claim-
ant in appellees' position already has filed once before the 
annual filing obligations come due. That these claimants al-
ready have made one filing under the Act indicates that they 
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know, or must be presumed to know, of the existence of the 
Act and of their need to inquire into its demands. 16 The re-
quirement of an annual filing thus was not so unlikely to come 
to the attention of those in the position of appellees as to ren-
der unconstitutional the notice provided by the three-year 
grace period. 17 
Despite the fact that FLPMA meets the three standards 
laid down in . Texaco for the imposition of new regulatory 
restraints on existing property rights, the District Court 
seemed to believe that individualized notice of the filing dead-
lines was nonetheless constitutionally required. The Dis-
trict Court felt that such a requirement would not be "overly 
burdensome" to the Government and would be of great bene-
fit to mining claimants. The District Court may well be 
right that such an individualized notice scheme would be a 
sound means of administering the Act. 18 But in the regula-
tion of private property rights, the Constitution offers the 
courts no warrant to inquire into whether some other scheme 
might be more rational or desirable than the one chosen by 
Congress; as long as the legislative scheme is a rational way 
of reaching Congress' objectives, the efficacy of alternative 
11 As a result, this is not a case in which individual notice of a statutory 
change must be given because a statute is "sufficiently unusual in charac-
ter, and triggered in circumstances so commonplace, that an average citi-
zen would have no reason to regard the triggering event as calling for a 
heightened awareness of one's legal obligations." Texaco, 454 U. S., at 
547 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
11 BLM does provide for notice and a hearing on the adjudicative fact of 
whether the required filings were actually made, and appellees availed 
themselves of this process by appealing, to the Department of Interior 
Board of Land Appeals, the BLM order that extinguished their claims for 
failure to make a timely filing. 
11 In the exercise of its administrative discretion, BLM for the last sev-
eral years has chosen to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several 
months before the end of the year; according to the Government, these 
notices state that "you must file on or before 12/30 [of the relevant year.] 
Failure to file timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim 
abandoned." Brief for Appellants 31-32, n. 22. 
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routes is for Congress alone to consider. "It is enough to say 
that the Act approaches the problem of [developing a national 
recording system] rationally; whether a [different notice 
scheme] would have been wiser or more practical under the 
circumstances is not a question of constitutional dimension." 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U. S. 1, 19 (1975). 
Because we deal here with purely economic legislation, Con-
gress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable to place 
a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to make the 
national recording system work. See Ibid; Weinberger v. 
Salji, 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publica-
tions Seroice, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). The District Court 
therefore erred in invoking the Constitution to supplant the 
valid administrative scheme established by Congress. The 
judgment below is reversed, and the case remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83- 1394 
UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. 
MADISON D. LOCKE ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
[March-, 1985] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, 
dissenting. 
The Court's opinion is contrary to the intent of Congress, 
engages in unnecessary constitutional adjudication, and un-
justly creates a trap for unwary property owners. First, the 
choice of the language "prior to December 31" when read in 
context in 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a) 1 is, at least, ambiguous, and, 
1 The full text of 43 U. S. C. § 17 44 reads as follows: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
"(a) Filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21 , 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an 
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21, 1976 shall, 
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the 
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this subsection: 
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work) , an affidavit of 
assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by sec-
tion 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto. 
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy 
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para- j 
T do"'~ ~;,J -Rere ~~ a"''Jfi'~i we l-\eJ leSfllv. 
J:o ~ _ TD 5D>vte · e'l--k.J-1 014\ "'ew ~D~ S 5~ 
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at best, "the consequence ·of a legislative accident, perhaps 
caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Con-
gress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it 
should." 2 In my view, Congress actually intended to 
authorize an annual filing at any time prior to the close of 
business on December 31st, that is, prior to the end of the 
calendar year to which the filing pertains. 3 Second, even if 
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
"(b) Additional filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel 
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period 
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by 
the Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certifi-
cate of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim 
or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel 
site located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date 
of location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the 
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate 
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill 
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
"(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely 
filing 
"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandon-
ment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not 
be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely 
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording 
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but 
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site. 
"(d) Validity of claims, waiver of assessment, etc., as unaffected 
"Such recordation or application by itself shall not render valid any claim 
which would not be otherwise valid under applicable law. Nothing in this 
section shall be construed as a waiver of the assessment and other require-
ments of such law." 
2 Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 97 (1977) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
8 This view was expressed at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 
in July of 1977: 
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Congress irrationally intended that the applicable deadline 
for a calendar year should end one day before the end of the 
calendar year that has been recognized since the amendment 
of the Julian calendar in 8 B. C., it is clear that appellees 
have substantially complied with the requirements of the 
statute, in large part because the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment has issued interpreting regulations that recognize sub-
stantial compliance. Further, the Court today violates not 
only the long-followed principle that a court should "not pass 
on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construc-
tion of the statute is fairly possible by which the question 
may be avoided," 4 but also the principle that a court should 
"not decide a constitutional question if there is some other 
ground upon which to dispose of the case." 5 
I 
Congress enacted § 314 of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act to establish for federal land planners and 
managers a federal recording system designed to cope with 
the problem of stale claims, and to provide "an easy way of 
"It is plain that Congress intended the filing requirement to expire with 
the last day of the year, but inartful draftsmanship requires all filings 
under Subsection 314(a) of the Act to be made on or before December 30th. 
Such is the result of the unfortunate use of the words 'prior to December 
31.' And since December 31st bears no relationship to the assessment 
year, which ends at noon on September 1st of each year, the statutory 
requirement that the locator shall file the necessary documents on or 
before December 30th of each year following the calendar year in which 
a claim was located, means that where a claim is located after noon on 
September 1st in any calendar year, the locator must file in the next full 
calendar year a notice of intention to hold, because no assessment work 
requirement has yet arisen." Sherwood, Mining-claim Recordation and 
Prospecting under The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 
23 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 1, 25 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
• United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27 (1980). 
5 Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan, -- U. S. --, -- (1984) 
(per curiam); see also Atkins v. Parker, --U.S. --, -- (1985); 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) 
(Justice Brandeis, concurring). 
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discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or 
invalid mining claim locations." 6 I submit that the appel-
lees' actions in this -case did not diminish the importance of 
these congressional purposes; to the contrary, their actions 
were entirely consistent with the statutory purposes, despite 
the confusion created by the "inartful draftsmanship" of the 
statutory language. 7 
A careful reading of§ 314 discloses at least three respects 
in which its text cannot possibly reflect the actual intent of 
Congress. First, the description of what must be filed in the 
initial filing and subsequent annual filings is quite obviously 
garbled. Read literally, § 314(a)(2) seems to require that a 
notice of intent to hold the claim and an affidavit of assess-
ment work performed on the claim must be filed "on a de-
tailed report provided by§ 28-1 of Title 30." One must sub-
stitute the word "or" for the word "on" to make any sense at 
all out of this provision. This error should cause us to pause 
before concluding that Congress commanded blind allegiance 
to the remainder of the literal text of§ 314. 
Second, the express language of the statute is unambigu-
ous in describing the place where the second annual filing 
shall be made. If the statute is read inflexibly, the owner 
must "file in the office of the Bureau" the required docu-
ments. 8 Yet the regulations that the Bureau itself has 
drafted, quite reasonably, construe the statute to allow filing 
in a mailbox, provided that the document is actually received 
by the Bureau prior to the close of business on January 19th 
6 S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975). The Court 
agrees regarding the first purpose, but inexplicably and without citation 
concludes that another purpose of section 314 is "to provide federal land 
managers with up-to-date information that allows them to make informed 
1 
management decisions." Ante, at 2-3. This latter statutory "purpose" is 
not mentioned in the legislative history; rather, it is a variation of a "pur-
pose," equally without citation, offered by appellants. See Brief of Appel-
lants 45, 47. 
7 See n. 3, supra. 
8 See 43 u.s. c. § 1744(a)(2). 
.. 
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of the year following the year in which the statute requires 
the filing to be made. 9 A notice mailed on December 30, 
1982, and received by the Bureau on January 19, 1983, was 
filed "in the office of the Bureau" during 1982 within the 
meaning of the statute, but one that is hand-delivered to the 
office on December 31, 1982, cannot be accepted as a 1982 
"filing." 
The Court finds comfort in the fact that the implementing 
regulations have eliminated the risk of injustice. Ante, at 
9-10. But if one must rely on those regulations, it should be 
apparent that the meaning of the statute itself is not all that 
obvious. To begin with, the regulations do not use the lan-
guage "prior to December 31;" instead, they use "on or before 
December 30 of each year." 10 The Bureau's drafting of the 
regulations using this latter phrase indicates that the mean-
ing of the statute itself is not quite as "plain," ante, at 8, as 
the Court assumes; if the language were plain, it is doubtful 
9 43 CFR § 3833. 0-5(m) provides: 
" 'Filed or file' means being received and date stamped by the proper BLM 
office. For the purpose of complying with § 3833.2-1 of this title, 'timely 
filed' means being filed within the time period prescribed by law, or re-
ceived by January 19th after the period prescribed by law in an envelope 
bearing a clearly dated postmark affixed by the United States Postal Serv-
ice within the period prescribed by law. This 20 day period does not apply 
to a notice of location filed pursuant to § 3833.1-2 of this title. (See 
§ 1821.2-2(e) of this title where the last day falls on a date the office is 
closed.)" 
10 43 CFR § 3833.2-l(b)(l). It is undisputed that the regulations did not 
come to the attention of the appellees. To justify the forfeiture in this 
case on the ground that appellees are chargeable with constructive notice 
of the contents of the Federal Register is no more acceptable to me today 
than it would have been to Justice Jackson in 1947. "To my mind, it is an 
absurdity to hold that every farmer who insures his crops knows what the 
Federal Register contains or even knows that there is such a publication. 
If he were to peruse this voluminous and dull publication as it is issued 
from time to time in order to make sure whether anything has been pro-
mulgated that affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for 
he would never get time to plant any crops." Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp. v. Merril, 332 U. S. 380, 387 (1947) (Justice Jackson, dissenting) . 
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that the Bureau would have found it necessary to change the 
language at all. Moreover, the Bureau, under the aegis of 
the Department of tbe Interior, once issued a pamphlet enti-
tled "Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands" that con-
tained the following information: 
"Owners of claims or sites located on or before Oct. 21, 
1976, have until Oct. 22, 1979, to file evidence of assess-
ment work performed the preceding year or to file a 
notice of intent to hold the claim or site. Once the claim 
or site is recorded with BLM, these documents must be 
filed on or before December 31 of each subsequent year." 
Id., at 9-10 (1978) (emphasis added). 
"Plain language," ante, at 8, indeed. 
There is a more important reason why the implementing 
regulations cannot be supportive of the result the Court 
reaches today: the Bureau's own deviation from the statutory 
language in its mail-filing regulation. See supra, n. 9. If 
the Bureau had issued regulations expressly stating that a 
December 31 filing would be considered timely-just as it has 
stated that a mail filing received on January 19th is timely-
it is inconceivable that anyone would question the validity of 
its regulation. It appears, however, that the Bureau has 
more power to interpret an awkwardly drafted statute in an 
enlightened manner consistent with Congress' intent than 
does this Court. 11 
11 The Court, ante, at 17, n. 14, criticizes my citation of the BLM regula-
tions to demonstrate that the agency has itself departed from the "plain" 
statutory language by allowing mail filings to be received by January 19th. 
In the same breath, the Court acknowledges that the agency is not bound 
by the "plain" language in "administering the statute." Ibid. The mail-
delivery deadline makes it clear that the Court's judicially created "up-to-
date" statutory purpose is utterly lacking in foundation. The agency's 
adoption of the January 19th deadline illustrates that it does not need 
the information by December 30; that it is not bound by the language of 
the provision; and that subtantial compliance does not interfere with the 
agency's statutory functions or with the intent of Congress. 
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In light of the foregoing: I cannot believe that Congress 
intended the words "prior to December 31 of each year" to be 
given the literal reaaing the Court adopts today. The statu-
tory scheme requires periodic filings on a calendar-year 
basis. The end of the calendar year is, of course, correctly 
described either as "prior to the close of business on Decem-
ber 31," or "on or before December 31," but it is surely 
understandable that the author of § 314 might inadvertently 
use the words "prior to December 31" when he meant to refer 
to the end of the calendar year. As the facts of this case 
demonstrate, the scrivener's error is one that can be made in 
good faith. The risk of such an error is, of course, the great-
est when the reference is to the end of the calendar year. 
That it was in fact an error seems rather clear to me because 
no one has suggested any rational basis for omitting just one 
day from the period in which an annual filing may be made, 
and I would not presume that Congress deliberately created 
a trap for the unwary by such an omission. 
It would be fully consistent with the intent of Congress to 
treat any filing received during the 1980 calendar year as a 
timely filing for that year. Such an interpretation certainly 
does not interfere with Congress' intent to establish a federal 
recording system designed to cope with the problem of stale 
mining claims on federal lands. The system is established, 
and apparently, functioning. 12 Moreover, the claims here 
12 Several amici have filed materials listing numerous cases in which it is 
asserted that the Bureau is using every technical construction of the stat-
ute to suck up active mining claims much as a vacuum cleaner, if not 
watched closely, will suck up jewelry or loose money. See Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation 2 (claiming that an "over-
whelming number of mining claims have been lost to the pitfalls of section 
314"), 3 (claiming that from 1977 to 1984 "unpatented mining claimants lost 
almost 20,000 active locations due to the technical rigors and conclusive 
presumption of section 314"), App. 1-86 (listing cases); Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Alaska Miners Association, California Mining Association, 
Nevada Mining Association, Miners Advocacy Council, and Placer Miners 
Association Exhibit A (letter from Bureau's Utah State Office stating that 
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were active; the Bureau was well aware that the appellees 
intended to hold and to operate their claims. 
Additionally, a sensible construction of the statute does not 
interfere with Congress' intention to provide "an easy way of 
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or 
invalid mining claim locations." 13 The Bureau in this case 
was well aware of the existence and production of appellees' 
mining claims; only by blinking reality could the Bureau 
reach the decision that it did. It is undisputed that the 
appellees made the first 1980 filing on August 29, 1980, and 
made the second required filing on December 31, 1980; the 
Bureau did not declare the mining claims "abandoned and 
void" until April 4, 1981. Thus, appellees lost their entire 
livelihood for no practical reason, contrary to the intent of 
Congress, and because of the hypertechnical construction of a 
poorly drafted statute, which an agency interprets to allow 
"filings" far beyond December 30 in some circumstances, but 
then interprets inflexibly in others. 14 Appellants acknowl-
well over 1400 claims were invalidated from 1979-1983 because§ 1744(a)(l) 
filings were made on December 31), Exhibit B (letter from Bureau's 
Billings, Montana Office stating that 198 claims were invalidated from 
1979-1983 because§ 1744(a)(l) filings were made on December 31), Exhibit 
C (letter from Bureau's Wyoming State Office stating that 11 claims were 
invalidated in 1980-1982 because§ 1744(a)(2) filings were made on Decem-
ber 31), Exhibit D (letter from Bureau's Arizona State Office stating that 
"approximately 500 claims have been invalidated due to filing an affidavit 
one day late"); Brief of Amicus Curiae Mobil Oil Corporation 2-4 (claiming 
to be in a situation similar to the appellees'). According to the Bureau's 
own calculations, thousands of active mining claims have been terminated 
because filings made on December 31 were considered untimely. These 
representations confirm the picture painted by amici of a federal bureau-
cracy virtually running amok, and surely operating contrary to the intent 
of Congress, by terminating the valuable property rights of hard-working, 
productive citizens of our country. 
18 S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975). 
l 
14 The Court suggests that appellees' failure to file by December 30 
"caused the property right to be extinguished." Ante, at 22. However, 
the Court, on the one hand, carefully avoids mentioning the three-month 
,., 
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edge that "[i]t may well be-that Congress wished to require 
filing by the end of the calendar year and that the earlier 
deadline resulted from careless draftmanship." Brief for 
Appellants 42, n. 31. I have no doubt that Congress would 
have chosen to adopt a construction of the statute that filing 
take place by the end of the calendar year if its attention had 
been focused on this precise issue. Cf. DelCostello v. Team-
sters, -- U. S. --, -- (1984). 16 
period that elapsed after December 31 before the Bureau declared the -
appellees' mining claims abandoned, and, on the other hand, describes 
the Bureau as needing "up-to-date information that allows them to make 
informed and expeditious land management decisions." Id., at 2-3, 21. 
'~The Court, ante, at 11, n. 12, lists several provisions in the United 
States Code as supportive of its position that "prior to December 31" is 
somehow less ambiguous because of its occasional use in various statutory 
provisions. It then states that it "is unclear whether the arguments ad-
vanced by the dissenters are meant to apply to all of the provisions, or only 
to some of them." Ibid. However, the provisions cited for support illus-
trate the lack of justification for the Court's approach, and highlight the 
uniqueness of the provision in this case. Twelve of the thirteen provisions 
refer to a on£_-t~~ecific date; the provision at issue here requires 
specific action on a continual annual basis, thus involving a much greater 
risk of creating a trap for the unwary. Further, each of the specific dates 
mentioned in the twelve provisions is long past; thus, contrary to the 
Court's premise, this decision would have no effect on them because they 
require no future action. See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5) ("prior to December 
31, 1937"); 12 U. S. C. § 1709)(o)(1)(e) ("prior to December 31, 1976"); 
12 U. S. C. § 1823(g) ("prior to December 31, 1950"); 12 U. S. C. 
§ 1841(a)(5)(A) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 26 U. S. C. § 503(d)(1) 
(''prior to December 31, 1955"); 33 U. S. C. § 1319(a)(5)(B) ("prior to 
December 31, 1974"); 42 U. S. C. § 415(a)(1)(c)(ii) ("prior to December 20, 
1977"); 42 U. S. C. § 1962d-17(b) ("prior to December 31, 1969"); 42 
U. S. C. § 5614(b)(5) ("after the first year following October 3, 1977, prior 
to December 31"); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1982"); 
42 U. S. C. § 7521(b)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 50 U. S. C., App. 
§ 41 ("prior to December 31, 1961"); 50 U. S. C., App. § 1741 ("prior to 
December 31, 1970"). The remaining provision cited as authority by the 
Court, 22 U. S. C. § 3784(c), states that the Panama Canal and certain 
other property "shall not be transferred to the Republic of Panama prior to 
December 31, 1999." The legislative history indicates that that language 
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After concluding its constitutional analysis, the District 
Court also held thai "the standard to be applied to assess-
ment notice requirements is substantial compliance. Meas-
ured against this, the Lockes have satisfied their statutory 
duties under Section 17 44 by filing their notices one day 
late." 16 The District Court grounded its holding on this 
Court's analysis in Hickel v. Oil Shale Corporation, 400 
u. s. 48 (1970). 
In Hickel, the Court construed 30 U. S. C. §28, which 
read: 
"On each claim located after the lOth day of May 1872, 
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less than 
$100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements 
made during each year .... [U]pon a failure to comply 
with these conditions, the claim or mine upon which 
such failure occurred shall be open to relocation in the 
same manner as if no location of the same had ever been 
made, provided that the original locators, their heirs, 
assigns, or legal representatives, have not resumed 
work upon the claim after failure and before such loca-
tion." (Emphasis added). 
Recognizing that a claimant's "possessory title" should not be 
disturbed on flimsy or insubstantial grounds," 400 U. S., at 
57, the Court wrote: 
"We agree . . . that every default in assessment work 
does not cause the claim to be lost. Defaults, however, 
might be the equivalent of abandonment; and we now 
hold that token assessment work, or assessment work 
was added to make "clear that the President is not authorized to accelerate 
the final transfer of the Panama Canal in 1999, as provided by the Panama 
Canal Treaty of 1977." H. R. Conf. Report 96-473, 96th Cong. , 1st Sess. 
61 (1979). The Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, Art. II, indicates that it 
"shall terminate at noon, Panama time, December 31, 1999." Therefore, 
the language of section 3784(c) was tailored to a unique treaty provision. 
18 Locke v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 479 (D Nev. 1983). 
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that does not substantially satisfy the requirements of 30 
U. S. C. § 28, is not adequate to 'maintain' the claims 
within the meaning of § 37 of the Leasing Act. To hold 
otherwise would help defeat the policy of the United 
States, as the prospective recipient of royalties, a bene-
ficiary of these oil shale claims. We cannot support 
[Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306 (1930),] and [Ickes 
v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U. S. 639 
(1935)], on so broad a ground. Rather, their dicta to the 
contrary, we conclude that they must be confined to situ-
ations where there had been substantial compliance with 
the assessment work requirements .... " 400 U. S., 
at 57. 
Hickel thus demonstrates that the District Court was cor-
rect that subtantial-compliance analysis was appropriate in 
this case, and that appellees substantially complied with 
the statute. Appellees earned their livelihood since 1960 by 
mining the ten unpatented mining claims now in dispute. 17 
They paid income taxes, and property and production taxes 
to the State of Nevada, which appears as an amici in support 
of appellees. The statute, passed in 1976, required appellees 
to register their mining claims "in the office where the loca-
tion notice or certificate is recorded" and "in the office of 
the Bureau" by October 21, 1979; it is undisputed that appel-
lees met the statute's two initial filing requirements. 18 
Moreover, the statute required, within three years of Octo-
ber 21, 1976, that appellees file "in the office of the Bureau 
designated by the Secretary a copy of the official record of 
the notice of location or certificate of location." 19 Appellees 
also met this third requirement, thus completely informing 
the Bureau of the existence, the sizes, the locations and the 
ownership of appellees' active mining claims. After the 
three initial filing requirements, the statute required that 
17 I d., at 474. 
18 Ibid. 
19 43 u. s. c. § 1744(b). 
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appellees make two separate annual filings: (1) an initial filing 
with the county recorder; and (2) a copy of the official record 
of the first filing filed with the Bureau. Appellees made the 
first of these filings for the 1980 calendar year on August 29, 
1980. Because 1980 was generally the first year that claim-
ants-including appellees-had to comply with the annual 
filing requirements that the new legislation mandated, the 
Bureau began the practice of mailing reminder notices about 
the filing due in the Bureau's office. Appellants acknowl-
edge that appellees did not receive a reminder notice. 20 N ev-
ertheless, appellees responsibly inquired about the date of 
filing with the Bureau for the 1980 calendar year; it is undis-
puted that Bureau personnel informed them that the filing 
was due "on or before December 31, 1980." 21 On December 
31, 1980, appellees made a 700-mile round trip from Ely to 
Reno, Nevada to hand deliver their filings to the Bureau. 
The Bureau accepted the filings on that date. 
In my view, this unique factual matrix unequivocally con-
tradicts the statutory presumption of an intent to abandon by 
reason of a late filing. In sum, this case presents an ambigu-
ous statute, which, if strictly construed will destroy valuable 
rights of appellees, property owners who have complied with 
all local and federal statutory filing requirements apart from 
a one-day "late" filing caused by the Bureau's own failure 
to mail a reminder notice necessary because of the statute's 
ambiguity and caused by the Bureau's information to appel-
lees that the date on which the filing occurred would be 
acceptable. Further, long before the Bureau declared a 
technical "abandonment," it was in complete possession of all 
information necessary to assess the activity, locations, and 
ownership of appellees' mining claims and it possessed all 
information needed to carry out its statutory functions. Fi-
nally, the Bureau has not claimed that the filing is contrary to 
the congressional purposes behind the statute, that the filing 
20 Reply Brief for Appellants 13, n. 12. 
21 Affidavit of Laura C. Locke 1!3. 
.. 
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affected the Bureau's land-use planning functions in any man-
ner, or that it interfered "in any measurable way" with the 
Bureau's need to obtain information. 22 A showing of sub-
stantial compliance necessitates a significant burden of proof; 
appellees, whose active mining claims will be destroyed con-
trary to Congress' intent, have convinced me that they have 
substantially complied with the statute. 
I respectfully dissent . 
22 Brief for Appellants 45. 
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D. LOCKE ET AL. 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. 
I agree that the District Court erred in holding that 
§ 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(c), violates due process by 
creating an "irrebuttable presumption" of abandonment. 
Whatever the force of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), 
beyond the facts underlying that case, I believe that § 314(c) 
comports with due process under the analysis of our later de-
cision in Weinberger v. Salji, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Because 
I also believe that the statute does not otherwise violate 
the Fifth Amendment and that the District Court erred in its 
alternative holding that substantial compliance satisfies the 
filing requirements of § 314 and corresponding regulations, I 
agree that the judgment below must be reversed. N onethe-
less, I share many of the concerns expressed in the dissenting 
opinions of JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE STEVENS. If the 
facts are as alleged by appellees, allowing the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) to extinguish active mining claims that 
appellees have owned and worked for more than 20 years 
would seem both unfair and inconsistent with the purposes 
underlying FLPMA. 
The Government has not disputed that appellees sought in 
good faith to comply with the statutory deadline. Appellees 
contend that in order to meet the requirements of§ 314, they 
contacted the BLM and were informed by agency personnel 
~ .. ,·h-ce D'Co ..... vr E'C\CDtA(Q~f'S -1k> Gffee) -I;; rre5S -1lo ~ 
or~,_...,J~ U..{ess-rL., ~ c~'(' -liolo....s, ~. if5 
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that they could file the required materials on December 31, 
1980. Appellees apparently relied on this advice and hand-
delivered the appropriate documents to the local BLM office 
on that date. The BLM accepted the documents for filing, 
but some three months later sent appellees a notice stating 
that their mining claims were "abandoned and void" because 
the filing was made on, rather than prior to, December 31, 
1980. Although BLM regulations clarify the filing deadlines 
contained in § 314, the existence of those regulations does not 
imply that appellees were unjustified in their confusion con-
cerning the deadlines or in their reliance on the advice pro-
vided by BLM's local office. The BLM itself in 1978 issued 
an explanatory pamphlet stating that the annual filings were 
to be made "on or before December 31" of each year. Ante, 
at 4, n. 7. Moreover, the BLM evidently has come to under-
stand the need to clarify the nature of the annual filing 
requirement, because it now sends reminder notices every 
year to holders of recorded mining claims warning them that 
the deadline is approaching and that filings must be made on 
or before December 30. 
The unusual facts alleged by appellees suggest that the 
BLM's actions might estop the Government from relying on 
§ 314(c) to obliterate a property interest that has provided a 
family's livelihood for decades. The Court properly notes 
that the estoppel issue was not addressed by the District 
Court and will be open on remand. Ante, at 5, n. 7. In this 
regard, I merely note that in my view our previous decisions 
do not preclude application of estoppel in this context. In 
Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, 
-- U. S. -- (1984), we expressly declined to adopt "a flat 
rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against 
the Government." I d., at --. Such a rule was unnec-
essary to the decision in that case, and we noted our reluc-
tance to hold that "there are no cases in which the public 
interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law 
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervail-
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ing interest of citizens in som~ minimum standard of decency, 
honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Govern-
ment." Id., at --_(footnote omitted). 
Although "it is well settled that the Government may not 
be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant," id., at 
-- (footnote omitted), we have never held that the Govern-
ment can extinguish a vested property interest that has been 
legally held and actively maintained for more than 20 years 
merely because the private owners relied on advice from 
agency personnel concerning a poorly-worded statutory 
deadline and consequently missed a filing deadline by one 
day. Thus, if the District Court ultimately determines that 
appellees reasonably relied on communications from the BLM 
in making their annual filing on December 31, 1980, our pre-
vious decisions would not necessarily bar application of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the fact that 
the Court reverses the decision of the District Court does not 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS's dissent. I write 
separately only because under the special circumstances of 
this case I do not believe it necessary to decide what Con-
gress actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in 
believing that Congress intended to require filings on or 
before the next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more 
reasonably, by the end of the calendar year itself, the statu-
tory deadline is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional 
requirements. It simply fails to give property holders clear 
and definite notice of what they must do to protect their 
existing property interests. 
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 1-2, the Government 
since the nineteenth century has encouraged its citizens to 
discover and develop certain minerals on the public lands. 
Under the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., an 
individual who locates a mining claim has the right of ex-
clusive possession of the land for mining purposes and may 
extract and sell minerals he finds there without paying a 
royalty to the federal government. I d. § 26. After making 
a valuable mineral discovery, the claimant may hold the claim 
so long as he performs $100 worth of assessment work each 
year. I d. § 28. If he performs certain additional conditions, 
the claimant may patent the claim for a nominal sum and 
thereby obtain further rights over the land and minerals. 
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See id. § 29. Until recently, there were no federal record-
ation requirements. 
Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created 
as to property rights on public lands, Congress enacted § 314 
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90 
Stat. 2769, 43 U.S. C. § 1744. 1 This provision required 
existing claimholders to record their claims in order to retain 
them. More specifically, it required that "within the three-
year period following October 21, 1976 and prior to December 
31 of each year thereafter," id. § 1744(a), claimholders file 
with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a no-
tice of intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assess-
ment work, or a special form, id. § 1744(a)(1) and (2). Fail-
ure to make either the initial or a subsequent yearly filing 
was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment 
of the mining claim .... " !d. § 1744(c). 
Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of ten unpatented min-
ing claims on federal land in Nevada. They located these 
' Section 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), states in its entirety: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
"(a) Filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an 
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21, 1976 shall, 
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the 
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this subsection. 
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of 
assessment work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed report provided by 
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto. 
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy 
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
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claims in 1952 and 1955 and have, since 1960, earned their 
livelihood by producing gravel and other building materials 
from them. From-1960 to the present, they have produced 
approximately $4,000,000 worth of materials. During the 
1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and 
other materials worth more than $1,000,000. In no sense 
were their claims stale. 
The Lockes fully complied with § 314's initial recordation 
requirement by properly filing a notice of location on October 
19, 1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the sub-
sequent yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent 
their daughter, who worked in their business office, to the 
Ely, Nevada office of the BLM. There she inquired into how 
and when they should file the assessment notice and was told, 
among other things, that the documents should be filed at the 
Reno office "on or before December 31, 1980." Locke v. 
United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (Nev. 1983). Following 
this advice, the Lockes hand-delivered their documents at 
the Reno office on that date. On April4, 1981, they received 
notice from the BLM that their mining claims were "aban-
doned and void," App. to Juris. Statement 22a, because they 
had filed on, rather than prior to, December 31. 2 It is this 
one-day difference in good faith interpretation of the statu-
tory deadline that gives rise to the present controversy. 
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground." 
2 The notice from the BLM also stated that "[s]ubject to valid interven-
ing rights of third parties or the United States void or abandoned claims or 
sites may be relocated and, based on the new location date, the appropriate 
instruments may be refiled within the time periods prescribed by the regu-
lations." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. Unlike most claimants, however, 
the Lockes were unable to relocate their claims because the Common Vari-
eties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611 et seq., had withdrawn deposits of com-
mon building materials from coverage of the general mining laws. To 
them, forfeiture meant not relocation and refiling, but rather irrevocable 
loss of their claims-the source of their livelihoods. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS corre.etly points to a number of circum-
stances that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress 
drafted§ 314 and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that 
(i) the section does not clearly describe what must be filed, let 
alone when it must be filed; (ii) BLM's rewording of the dead-
line in its implementing regulations, 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a)(1), 
indicates that the BLM itself considered the statutory dead-
line confusing; (iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM 
recognized this possible confusion, even it had described the 
section in a pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requir-
ing filing "on or before December 31;" (iv) BLM, charged with 
enforcing the section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and 
(v) irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day 
before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the year 
itself, creates "a trap for the unwary," post, at 7. As 
JUSTICE STEVENS also states, these facts, particularly the l 
last, suggest not only that Congress drafted § 314 inartfully 
but also that Congress may actually have intended to require 
filing "on or before," not "prior to," December 31. This is 
certainly the more reasonable interpretation of congressional 
intent and is consistent with all the policies of the Act. 
I do not believe, however, that given the special circum-
stances of this case we need determine what Congress actu-
ally intended. As the Court today recognizes, the Takings 
Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power 
to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 16-18. In Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), we identified one of the most 
important of these limitations when we stated that "the State 
has the power to condition the permanent retention of [a] 
property right on the performance of reasonable conditions 
.... " ld., at 526 (emphasis added); accord Jackson v. 
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where a 
[forfeiture] provisio[n] . . . may be so unreasonable as to 
amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of 
the court ... "). Furthermore, conditions, like those here, 
imposed after a property interest is created must also meet 
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due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976). These standards require, 
among other things, that there be no question as to what 
actions an individual must take to protect his interests. 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. Together the 
Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the Government 
from depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily. 
In the present case there is no claim that a yearly filing 
requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim arises 
from the fact that the language "prior to December 31" cre-
ates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing 
period ends. 3 Given the natural tendency to interpret this 
phrase as "by the end of the calendar year," rather than "on 
or before the next-to-the-last day of the calendar year," I 
believe this uncertainty violated the standard of certainty 
and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The state-
ment in at least one of the Government's own publications 
that filing was required "on or before December 31," Depart-
ment of the Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal 
Lands 10 (1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a 
property interest because a property holder reasonably be-
lieved that under the statute he had an additional day to sat-
isfy any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than termi-
3 The Court believes it is "obligated to apply the 'prior to December 31' 
language by its terms" because "its meaning is clear." Ante, at 11. Such 
clarity, however, is not to be found in the words themselves. Courts, for 
example, have used these same words in similar contexts clearly to mean 
"by the end of the year," e. g., AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F. 2d 1096, 1108, 
1115 (CA11983); Bay State Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F. 2d 1, 2 (CAl 
1982), or have contrasted them with other phrases such as "[f]rom January 
1," NYSA-ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm. of New 
York Harbor, 732 F. 2d 292, 295 and n. 6 (CA2), cert. denied,- U. S. 
- (1984), or "after December 31," Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F. 2d 
266, 267 n. 3 (CA 7 1983), in ways that strongly suggest this meaning. 
Various administrative agencies have also followed this same usage in 
promulgating their regulations. E. g., 24 CFR § 570.423(b); 31 CFR 
§ 515.560(i); 40 CFR § 52.1174. 
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nating it for failure to satisfy these same conditions in an 
unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 
U. S. 55, 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632-633 
(1878). Although ·the latter may rest on impossibility, the 
former rests on good faith performance a day late of what 
easily could have been performed the day before. Neither 
serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of 
property rights to the State. 
I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the 
property holder with more certainty and definiteness than 
did § 314 when he must fulfill any recording requirements 
imposed after a property interest is created. Given the stat-
utory uncertainty here, I would find a forfeiture imposed for 
filing on December 31 to be invalid. 4 
I accordingly dissent. 
'Parties, of course, ordinarily are bound to the consequences of their l 
failing strictly to meet statutory deadlines. This is true, for example, as 
to statutes of limitations and other filing deadlines clearly specified. Be-
cause of the special circumstances JUSTICE STEVENS identifies and the con-
stitutional concerns identified above, this case is unique. 
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